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AMERICA’S FAVORITE ANTIDOTE:
DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE IN THE AGE OF THE OVERDOSE CRISIS
Leo Beletsky*
Abstract
Nearing the end of its second decade, the overdose crisis in the United
States continues to claim tens of thousands of lives. Despite the rhetorical
emphasis on a “public health” approach, criminal law and its
enforcement continue to play a central role among policy responses to this
crisis. A legacy of the 1980s War on Drugs, statutory provisions that
implicate drug distributors in overdose fatalities are on the books in many
U.S. jurisdictions and federally. This Article articulates an
interdisciplinary critique of these “drug-induced homicide” laws at a time
of their increased popularity, expanding scope, and aggressive
prosecution. That these policy mechanisms are deployed under the banner
of overdose prevention invites a critical public health lens to their reexamination.
After tracing the trajectory of the overdose crisis, this Article
examines the role of drug-induced homicide laws as exemplars of U.S.
drug policy’s reliance on criminal law to address problematic substance
use. An empirical analysis of publicized drug-induced homicide cases
documents a rapid and accelerating diffusion of prosecutions in many
hard-hit jurisdictions; pronounced racial disparities in enforcement and
sentencing; and broad misclassification of friends, partners, family
members, and others as “dealers.” In addition to crowding out evidencebased interventions and investments, these policies and prosecutions run
at direct cross-purposes to public health efforts that encourage witnesses
to summon lifesaving help during overdose events. At a time of crisis,
drug-induced homicide laws and prosecutions represent a false prophecy
of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. These findings support
further efforts to demobilize criminal law and criminal justice actors from
responding to drug-related harms in the U.S. as elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2010, Joshua Banka went on a drug-using spree in the city of
Nevada, Iowa.1 After crushing and injecting oxycodone pills he had stolen from a
friend, Banka and his wife Tammy Noragon Banka drove to a nearby town to
purchase heroin.2 Banka, who had a long history of substance use, had recently
reinitiated using heroin after abstaining for six months.3 A dealer named Marcus
Burrage sold Banka one gram of heroin in a grocery store parking lot.4 The couple
cooked and injected some of the drug in the car immediately following the
transaction and then again later upon returning home.5 After his wife had gone to
sleep in the early hours of April 15, 2010, Banka injected another batch.6
The next morning, Noragon found her husband’s lifeless body on the bathroom
floor and called 911.7 In conducting a death-scene investigation, police found drug
paraphernalia, about half of the recently procured heroin, and a cocktail of
prescription pills.8 Subjected to questioning, the bereaved wife picked Marcus
Burrage out of a photo lineup as the dealer who had sold them the ill-fated bag the
night before.9
Noragon was never arrested, but Burrage was soon apprehended and charged
with heroin distribution.10 After taking over this seemingly unremarkable drug case,
federal prosecutors charged Burrage with a seldom-used, but powerful enhancement
under the federal Controlled Substances Act.11 This provision—§ 841(b)(1)(C)—
mandates a sentence of twenty years to life in cases when “death . . . results from the
use of [the] substance” unlawfully distributed by the accused.12
At trial, two toxicologists testified to the presence of multiple substances in
Banka’s body at the time of death.13 In addition to heroin, this included metabolites
of prescription opioid analgesics and benzodiazepines.14 As depressants, all these
drugs act synergistically to slow down the central nervous system, including

1

Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 206 (2014).
Brief for the United States at 5–6, Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (No.
12-7515) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
3
Id. at 5.
4
Id. at 5–6.
5
Id. at 6.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. (noting that the drugs included opioid analgesics and benzodiazepines).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2018).
12
Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
13
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 207 (2014).
14
Id.
2
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respiration control.15 In view of multiple-drug toxicity, the experts opined that heroin
was likely an important “contributing” factor, but its causal role in Banka’s death
could not be determined.16 Nonetheless, Burrage was convicted on both the
distribution and “death results” charges, triggering the twenty-year minimum
sentence mandated under § 841(b)(1)(C).17
After losing on appeal at the District and then the Circuit levels, this case was
granted certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.18 There, Burrage’s contention that the
language in § 841(b)(1)(C)’s “death results” enhancement requires “but-for”
causation finally carried the day.19 Writing for the unanimous Court,20 the late
Justice Scalia rebuffed the Government’s reading of the enhancement, ultimately
rejecting its application in cases where the drug was not an independently sufficient
cause of death.21
In reaching this decision, Justice Scalia deliberated about the Government’s
predictions that the provision’s narrow construction would “unduly limi[t] criminal
responsibility” and run counter to public policy.22 In addition to the customary
retribution rationale—that drug dealers deserve severe sanctions based on their high
level of blame—the Government advanced a broader narrative of deterrence.
Without providing any empirical evidence, it contended that “extremely stiff
penalties” are a way to send a “clear message”23 to drug dealers. The goal articulated
by the provision’s drafters—and implied by the Government in Burrage—was to
“prevent further drug-related deaths.”24
Justice Scalia was characteristically acerbic in responding to the Government’s
predictions of a “public policy disaster” if the charge implicating Marcus Burrage in

15

Id.; see also Jermaine Jones et al., Polydrug Abuse: A Review of Opioid and
Benzodiazepine Combination Use, 125 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 8, 8–18 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3454351/ [http://perma.cc/7QM4-862M].
16
Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 7–9 (noting that the drugs included opioid
analgesics and benzodiazepines).
17
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 208–09.
18
Id. at 208.
19
Id. at 218–19 (holding that “a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty
enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-for cause of the
death or injury”).
20
Note that the decision was only unanimous in judgment, but not in reasoning. Justice
Ginsburg separately wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor. Further,
Justice Alita did not join Part III-B—the portion of the case discussing the rationale regarding
“but-for” causation. Thus, only five justices in total signed onto the decision’s resting on lack
of but-for causation.
21
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218–19.
22
Id. at 216 (quoting Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 24) (alteration in
original).
23
Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 4.
24
Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 26,453 (1986)
(statement of Sen. Mattingly)).
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Joshua Banka’s accidental overdose were vacated.25 But the late Justice’s opinion
never critiqued the deployment of such prosecutions—and the underlying statutory
provisions—as instruments of overdose prevention.26 This Article endeavors to do
just that.
Nearing the end of its second decade, the crisis of fatal opioid-involved
overdose in the United States continues unabated.27 In fact, the crisis has gone from
bad to worse,28 but not for the lack of evidence about how it can be brought under
control. There is broad agreement that reducing opioid overdose deaths requires
wider distribution of the opioid antidote naloxone, rapid scale-up in evidence-based
treatment, and reducing stigma associated with substance use and addiction.29
Progress on these—and other—vital measures remains abysmally slow, both in

25
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 216–17 (noting that federal prosecutors had a track record of
successfully applying § 841(b)(1)(C) in other cases involving multiple-drug toxicity, with
the operative difference that the experts were less ambivalent about the role of the substance
in the fatal outcome). From a practical perspective, even if the prosecutors could not secure
a conviction on the “death results” enhancement, the accused would still typically receive a
substantial sentence on the underlying drug trafficking charge. See id.
26
Perhaps a missed opportunity for public health-minded observers to submit an amicus
brief. Such an Amicus was recently submitted in a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
case involving a drug-induced homicide charge, see Brief for the Comm. for Public Counsel
Services et al., Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 2019 WL 400620 (Mass. 2019) (No. SJC–12617);
see also Leo Beletsky et al., Advancing Public Health Through the Law: The Role of Legal
Academics: Workshop Report (Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper No.
110-2012, 2012) (calling for increased involvement among public health legal academics in
different areas of litigation touching on public health issues).
27
See HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 294, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 2 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V9RW-NLQ5] (noting that the opioid overdose death rate “increased
on average by 10% per year from 1999 to 2006, by 3% per year from 2006 to 2014, and by
18% per year from 2014 to 2016”).
28
See id.
29
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE
SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 4–10 (2016),
https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9NYR-WXKK] [hereinafter FACING ADDICTION]; see also CHRIS CHRISTIE ET AL.,
THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS 7
(2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Report_Draft
_11-1-2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/9R3M-WHGB]; Jerome Adams, Surgeon General’s
Advisory on Naloxone and Opioid Overdose, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/priorities/opioid-overdose-prevention/naloxone-advisory.
htm [http://perma.cc/6JZR-YDTP]. See generally INST. OF MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2017).
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terms of translating empirical evidence into policy and implementing programs on
the ground.30
Meanwhile, progress has been far from sluggish in deploying § 841(b)(1)(C)
and similar state-level prosecutions as a response to fatal drug overdoses. Since
Joshua Banka’s death in 2010, such prosecutions have surged at least threefold to
now number in the thousands per year,31 while news mentions of drug-induced
homicide cases rise in tandem.32 During this period, a growing list of states passed—
and many more are considering—new provisions to enhance such charges.33 At the
time of this writing, thirty-six states had deployed these prosecutions in response to
the opioid crisis.34
In 2017, over 70,000 people died from drug overdoses.35 Drawing on their
established role as the go-to experts on drug policy, law enforcement leaders and
organizations have advanced drug-induced homicide laws and prosecutions as a core
element of our society’s response to this mass calamity.36 There are numerous ways

30

FACING ADDICTION, supra note 29, at 1–2; see also Barrot Lambdin et al., Identifying
Gaps in the Implementation of Naloxone Programs for Laypersons in the United States, 52
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 52, 52–55 (2018) (describing the gap in overdose education and
naloxone distribution programs); Noa Krawczyk et al., Only One in Twenty Justice-Referred
Adults in Specialty Treatment for Opioid Use Receive Methadone or Buprenorphine, 36
HEALTH AFF. 2046, 2050 (2017) (noting that only 1 in 20 individuals (4.6%) referred through
the criminal justice system to opioid use disorder treatment received appropriate agonist
medications).
31
LINDSAY LASALLE, DRUG POLICY ALL., AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER:
WHY DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 11 fig.2
(2017), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_drug_induced_homicide_report
_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2PT-MXYV] (charting the increase in drug-induced homicide
prosecutions from 2011–2016).
32
See,
e.g.,
Drug-Induced
Homicide,
HEALTH
JUST.
(2019),
https://www.healthinjustice.org/drug-induced-homicide
[https://perma.cc/5ZN6-Y8AP]
(tracking drug-induced homicide cases and updating visual analyses of these cases on
www.healthinjustice.org).
33
See Joseph Walker, Prosecutors Treat Opioid Overdoses as Homicides, Snagging
Friends, Relatives, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2017, 11:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
prosecutors-treat-opioid-overdoses-as-homicides-snagging-friends-relatives-1513538404
[http://perma.cc/6ZDB-WQKP].
34
See LASALLE, supra note 31, at 56–63; see also Drug Induced Homicide Laws
Database,
PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS.,
(Jan.
1,
2019),
http://pdaps.org/datasets/drug-induced-homicide-1529945480-1549313265-1559075032
[http://perma.cc/BE9E-2386].
35
HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 329, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1999–2017, at 1 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db
329.htm [http://perma.cc/K789-RPB8].
36
See, e.g., NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: A STATE AND
LOCAL PROSECUTOR RESPONSE 9–10 (2018), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-
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to scrutinize this paradigm. From a doctrinal standpoint, deployment of harsh
criminal penalties in retribution for unintended conduct raises thorny normative and
constitutional issues.37 As they relate to the felony murder doctrine, those questions
have been explored elsewhere by scholars expert in history, epistemology, and
theory of criminal law.38 The resulting consensus is nearly unanimous regarding
felony murder and other provisions that are corollaries to drug-induced homicide—
to be both bad law and bad criminal justice policy.39 And yet, drug-induced homicide
laws persist in most jurisdictions.40 Their surging deployment under the banner of
overdose prevention adds new urgency to their reexamination, inviting a critical
public health lens.41
This Article unfolds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the scope of the
opioid “epidemic,” tracing its macabre trajectory from a crisis driven primarily by
prescription analgesics to the rapid rise of fatalities involving black market drugs
like heroin and, more recently, illicitly manufactured fentanyl. As the supposed
antidote to problematic substance use,42 punishment has long been the central
instrument of the U.S. drug control system.43 Part II challenges the widely held
notion that a different, “public health” approach characterizes the response to the
current crisis. To illustrate the continued centrality of punitive policy narratives and
measures, Part III focuses on drug-induced homicide laws. After tracing their origins
Opioid-White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/JYK8-5X5N] (setting the agenda and objectives
for prosecutors to investigate overdoses as homicides).
37
See generally Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 965 (2008) (providing a comprehensive overview of the empirical and doctrinal
scholarship on felony murder).
38
See, e.g., id.; Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 973 (1985) (arguing that various justifications for punishment are not sufficient for
capital punishment); Paul Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths,
50 J.L. ECON. 221, 221–38 (2007).
39
Binder, supra note 37, at 966 (“Legal scholars are almost unanimous in condemning
felony murder as a morally indefensible form of strict liability.”); see also Jason Tashea,
California Considering End to Felony Murder Rule, AM. BAR ASS’N (July 5, 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california_considering_end_to_felony_murder_rul
e/ [http://perma.cc/Q67U-3KEL] (“Forty five states still have felony murder rules, 24 of
which allow for the death penalty in such cases. Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts and
Michigan have abolished the rule by either legislation or through the courts.”).
40
LASALLE, supra note 31; NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 36.
41
See generally James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Emerging Legal Responses to Curb the
Opioid Epidemic, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 460 (2017) (summarizing the national shift towards
characterizing the opioid epidemic as a public health emergency and the resulting legal
pressures).
42
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: FIFTH EDITION 483–85 (2013) (describing the key features of substance use
disorders).
43
MATTHEW R. PEMBLETON, CONTAINING ADDICTION: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S GLOBAL DRUG WAR 21–22 (2017).
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and theoretical underpinnings, this Part provides an instrumentalist critique of these
criminal justice interventions. For the first time, this appraisal draws on an original
dataset containing detailed information on 263 drug-induced homicide prosecutions
between 2000 and 2016, as well as a broader analysis of the media infosphere on
this issue.
The present analysis of key legal, logistical, and other case elements suggests
that, while the number and scope of these laws have grown in the wake of the opioid
crisis, prosecutions invoking these laws have proliferated even faster.44 Evaluated
for the first time here, emerging trends in the deployment of these provisions raise
grave concerns. Mapping onto existing racially disparate patterns of drug law and
felony murder enforcement,45 there is evidence to suggest that prosecutors are
applying drug-induced homicide charges selectively,46 resulting in gaping
sentencing disparities between whites and people of color.47
In contrast to the fact pattern in Burrage, however, approximately half of the
drug-induced homicide charges in the dataset ensnared co-using friends, family, or
romantic partners of the deceased.48 Had Tammy Noragon Banka handled the
purchase and brought the heroin to her husband that fateful night, she could have
been held liable for his death.49 Such common, but patently unjust application of
these provisions magnify individual and community trauma. They also run at crosspurposes to 911 Good Samaritan laws and other efforts to encourage help-seeking
during overdose events,50 while further fraying trust in the law and its enforcement

44

German Lopez, The New War on Drugs, VOX (Sept. 13, 2017, 7:50 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/5/16135848/drug-war-opioid-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/6NFW-DD7M] (noting that to specifically address the deadliness of illicit
fentanyl, legislative efforts are making it easier for prosecutors to apply mandatory
minimums and prosecute drug-induced homicide cases, and that at least 16 states have
increased punishment for dealing and possessing illicit fentanyl). This approach is also
garnering support on the federal level. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate, Senators
Introduce Legislation to Fight Fentanyl (2018), https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_
release&id=911 [http://perma.cc/S7QQ-YHQ5] (noting that the quantity of fentanyl
possession required to trigger mandatory minimums is reduced); Amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary), U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (2018), https://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20180412_pre
lim_rf_final.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivey
[http://perma.cc/P5XX2822].
45
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010).
46
See infra Figure 3.
47
See infra Figure 6.
48
See infra Figure 2.
49
Amanda Latimore & Rachel Bergstein, “Caught with a Body” Yet Protected by Law?
Calling 911 for Opioid Overdose in the Context of the Good Samaritan Law, 50 INT’L J.
DRUG POL’Y 82, 82–89 (2017).
50
Id.
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among people who use drugs.51 From a population perspective, a synthesis of
existing research with original data presented here support the finding that druginduced homicide laws and their deployment likely exacerbate fatal overdose risk,
fueling the very problem they purport to address.
Ultimately, the invocation of drug-induced homicide to address the overdose
crisis is symptomatic of U.S. overreliance on criminal law and its instruments to
regulate problematic substance use. Drawing on the common law maxim salus
populi suprema lex,52 public health must reclaim its historical role as the central
objective in the design and application of legal systems, including criminal law.53
The overdose crisis provides an opportunity to reexamine criminal justice responses
to drug policy challenges with that maxim in mind. A call for a substantial redesign
of that response architecture completes this Article.
I. THE U.S. OVERDOSE CRISIS AND ITS CONTEXT
A. The State of the Crisis
The United States is undergoing one of the most alarming public health crises
in its modern history. After a near fourfold rise in the rate of drug-related overdose
fatalities since the beginning of this century,54 deployment of policies and financial
resources to resolve the crisis have failed to do so.55 The untold devastation wrought
on families, communities, and businesses across the country is adding to the already
disproportionate burden on urban communities and people of color, in particular
Native Americans and older African-American men in urban centers.56

51

Kathryn Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is Also a Crackdown on Drug Users,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/acrackdown-on-drug-dealers-is-also-a-crackdown-on-drug-users/
[http://perma.cc/Y5V5DTDA].
52
The maxim has been translated to mean “the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.” See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1091 n.89 (1994).
53
See WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 51–54
(2009).
54
HEDEGAARD ET AL., supra note 35, at 1.
55
Id.
56
See THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID
CRISIS 3–6 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%20
Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/EWV2WK6V] (noting the large economic detriment of the crisis); Opioid Overdose Treated in
Emergency Departments, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/opioid-overdoses/index.html
[http://perma.cc/U2YQBJQD]; German Lopez, The Opioid Epidemic Has Now Reached Black America, VOX (Dec.
22, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/12/22/16808490/opioid
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Joshua Banka’s untimely death reflects the complexity of “opioid overdose”
events, on several fronts. His death involved a mixture of opioids, along with
additional sedatives and a slew of other substances.57 Polydrug toxicity currently
accounts for the majority of deaths involving opioids, including powerful synthetics
like fentanyl and its analogues.58 Returning to drug use after a period of abstinence
is another known risk factor for opioid poisonings, which also likely contributed to
Banka’s death.59
-epidemic-black-white [https://perma.cc/9WH3-S3HT]; STEPHANIE SCHMITZ BECHTELER &
KATHLEEN KANE-WILLIS, CHI. URBAN LEAGUE, WHITEWASHED: THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
OPIOID EPIDEMIC 2 (2017), https://www.thechicagourbanleague.org/cms/lib/IL07000264/
Centricity/Domain/1/Whitewashed%20AA%20Opioid%20Crisis%2011-15-17_EMBAR
GOED_%20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/6R3H-HNND] (noting that people of color already
experience a disproportionate burden of opioid overdose in numerous states in the Midwest
and elsewhere); N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, UNINTENTIONAL DRUG
POISONING (OVERDOSE) DEATHS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2000 TO 2016, 89 EPI DATA BRIEF 1
(2018), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/pdf/epi/databrief89.pdf [http://perma.
cc/C5UW-MXF4] (“Black New Yorkers had the largest increase (86%) compared with all
other races/ethnicities. The rate increased from 10.9 per 100,000 residents in 2015 to 20.3
per 100,000 residents in 2016.”); How The Opioid Crisis Is Affecting Native Americans,
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Nov. 11, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/11
/563551077/how-the-opioid-crisis-is-affecting-native-americans
[http://perma.cc/ZT3BGQTA] (noting that Native Americans have been the hardest hit by opioid overdoses of any
ethnic group); Native American Overdose Deaths Surge Since Opioid Epidemic,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/81eb3ae96c2b4f6aae
272ec50f0672d2 [http://perma.cc/PH5D-GTFL] (explaining that the increase in opioid
overdose deaths among Native Americans from 1999–2015 was higher than any other ethnic
group during the same period).
57
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 207 (2014).
58
Chelsea Carmona, What Opioid Hysteria Leaves Out: Most Overdoses Involve a Mix
of Drugs, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/commentisfree/2016/jun/08/opioid-epidemic-drug-mix-overdose-death [http://perma.
cc/EA7M-BMCL] (noting the under-appreciated and under-documented role of
polysubstance use as a driver of “opioid” overdose deaths). The role of polysubstance
overdose is reflective in the national picture as well, and is echoed in state and local data.
See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 56, at 2–3.
59
Detoxification or abstinence-based drug treatment, criminal detention, and other
episodes of forced interruption in opioid use dramatically lower an individual’s tolerance.
See Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Release from Prison—A High Risk of Death for Former
Inmates, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157, 160–61 tbl.3 (2007) (showing that among Washington
State prisoners, drug overdose was the leading cause of death among former inmates); see
also Derek C. Chang et al., A Case of Opioid Overdose and Subsequent Death After
Medically Supervised Withdrawal: The Problematic Role of Rapid Tapers for Opioid Use
Disorder, 12 J. ADDICTION MED. 80, 82 (2018); P.B. Christensen et al., Mortality Among
Danish Drug Users Released from Prison, 2 INT’L J. PRISONER HEALTH 13, 17 (2006); Shane
Darke and Michael Farrell, Would Legalizing Illicit Opioids Reduce Overdose Fatalities?
Implications From a Natural Experiment, 109 ADDICTION 1, 3–4 (2014); Michael Farrell &
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Another important element of overdoses involving opioids is that they create
an opportunity for life-saving intervention.60 Basic first aid and timely
administration of the opioid antidote naloxone reverses the deadly coma; this
prevents overdoses from turning fatal and helps people live to see another day.61
Combined, overdose education and naloxone distribution (OEND) into the
community have saved thousands of lives.62
But such efforts have long sparked controversy, raising concerns about sending
the “wrong message” and “enabling” immoral behavior.63 The argument against
naloxone distribution posits that doing so might push people who use drugs toward
ever-more risky practices64—what economists call “moral hazard.”65 Public health
researchers evaluating naloxone distribution have looked for behaviors reflecting
moral hazard, finding none.66 With few exceptions, analyses of naloxone’s moral
John Marsden, Acute Risk of Drug-Related Death Among Newly Released Prisoners in
England and Wales, 103 ADDICTION 251, 252–54 (2007); Jonathon Giftos & Lello Tesema,
When Less Is More: Reforming the Criminal Justice Response to the Opioid Epidemic, 57
AM. BAR ASS’N JUDGES’ J. 28, 28 (2018) (“The criminal justice system confers significant
additional health risks to patients with an opioid use disorder. Forced detoxification from
opioids while incarcerated lowers a patient’s opioid tolerance and is associated with a 129times increased risk of overdose death in the first two weeks after release into the community.
And untreated opioid withdrawal—a syndrome characterized by vomiting, diarrhea, intense
muscle cramps, and paralyzing anxiety—is a major risk factor for suicide in jails and
prisons.”).
60
See Administer Naloxone: Overdose Response, HARM REDUCTION COALITION
(2017),
http://harmreduction.org/issues/overdose-prevention/overview/overdosebasics/responding-to-opioid-overdose/administer-naloxone/ [http://perma.cc/HC7Z-QJQQ]
(explaining the step-by-step process of identifying and reversing an opioid overdose using
naloxone, an antidote that reverses opioid overdoses).
61
See, e.g., Leo Beletsky et al., Prevention of Fatal Opioid Overdose, 308 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1863, 1863–64 (2012) [hereinafter Beletsky et al., Prevention of Fatal Opioid
Overdose].
62
See FACING ADDICTION, supra note 29, at 4-12–4-13.
63
See Carrie Arnold, The Fight for the Overdose Drug, ATLANTIC (Dec. 29, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/12/the-fight-for-the-overdose-drug/38
3467/ [http://perma.cc/7D6E-KWM6].
64
Richard Knox, Overdose Rescue Kit Saves Lives, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(Jan. 2, 2008, 1:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17578955
[http://perma.cc/978Y-N4NX].
65
See Jennifer Doleac & Anita Mukherjee, The Moral Hazard of Lifesaving
Innovations: Naloxone Access, Opioid Abuse, and Crime 4–5 (Mar. 31, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3135264 [http://perma.cc
/A2EL-LCWT].
66
See, e.g., Robert Fenichel, Which Drugs Should be Available Over the Counter?, 329
BRITISH MED. J. (CLINICAL RES. EDITION) 182, 183 (2004) (posing the question of whether
easy access to naloxone might lead to opiate abuse and opining that “much public discussion
of moral hazards consists of baseless speculation”); Traci C. Green et al., Barriers to Medical
Provider Support for Prescription Naloxone as Overdose Antidote for Lay Responders, 48
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hazard reflect findings across various harm-reduction interventions, such as HPV
vaccination67 and HIV treatment as prevention,68 showing that health benefits far
outweigh hypothetical risks.69 Much maligned by similarly misguided concerns,
opioid agonist therapy (OAT) with maintenance medications including methadone
and buprenorphine help to slash overdose risk by 50–80 percent.70
Harm reduction infrastructure, including syringe service programs (SSPs),
facilitate overdose prevention by linking individuals with opioid use disorder to
OEND, substance use treatment, and other services. But these programs have been
embroiled in controversy and are subject to legal and policy resistance, limiting their
number and scope in the United States.71 The same goes for other measures known
to facilitate overdose prevention, including safe consumption facilities (SCFs).
These programs—which are linked to individual- and community-level overdose
fatality reduction—provide a space for drug use under the supervision of trained

SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 558, 562 (2013) (summarizing findings that “systematic
evaluation of nonmonetary moral hazard, including easy availability of naloxone, shows that
this concern is unfounded or creates little additional risk”) (citation omitted).
67
See Monica L. Kasting et al., Tempest in a Teapot: A Systematic Review of HPV
Vaccination and Risk Compensation Research, 12 HUM. VACCINES &
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1435, 1447 (2016).
68
See Kelly Freeborn & Carmen Portillo, Does Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) for
HIV Prevention in Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) Change Risk Behavior? A
Systematic Review, 27 J. CLINICAL NURSING 3254, 3261 (2017).
69
See, e.g., Jermaine D. Jones et al., No Evidence of Compensatory Drug Use Risk
Behavior Among Heroin Users After Receiving Take-Home Naloxone, 71 ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORS 104, 104–06 (2017) (finding that concerns of increased risk behavior among
opioid users treated with naloxone are often unfounded).
70
Leo Beletsky, 21st Century Cures for the Overdose Crisis: Promise, Impact, and
Missed Opportunities, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 365 (2018). For an overview of the evidence
supporting the overdose prevention benefits of OAT, see id. at 361–63.
71
See Beletsky et al., Prevention of Fatal Opioid Overdose, supra note 61, at 1863
(discussing the need for FDA action to approve syringe delivery systems). Nevertheless,
syringe exchange—a vital public health tool—is only authorized in 21 U.S. states and in the
District of Columbia. Laws Related to Syringe Exchange, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/policy/SyringeExchange.htm [https://perma.cc/
5GM9-5TWE] (last updated Sept. 28, 2017). Even when authorized by state or local law,
SSPs remain substantially under-resourced. Until recently, SSPs could not be supported by
federal funds, and funds still cannot be used to purchase of actual syringes. Traci C. Green
et al., Life After the Ban: An Assessment of US Syringe Exchange Programs’ Attitudes About
and Early Experiences with Federal Funding, 102 AM. J. HEALTH e9, e9 (2012). The CDC
estimates that the U.S. is in need of substantial additional syringe exchange capacity to bring
this proven intervention up to scale. See Danae Bixler et al., Access to Syringe Services
Programs—Kentucky, North Carolina, and West Virginia, 2013–2017, 67 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 529, 532 (2018).

844

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

staff.72 Not one such site is currently authorized to operate in the United States,
however.73 The bottom line is that, when it comes to policies that hold considerable
empirical promise for addressing the overdose crisis, we know what to do; we just
are not doing enough of it.74
B. Framing the “Opioid Epidemic”
The United States is a nation in pain,75 with over 100 million adults
complaining of pain in the last three months.76 Puzzlingly, Americans report being
in pain more frequently and at higher severity than “citizens of other advanced, and
even not-so-advanced, countries.”77 It should come as no surprise that America’s
consumption of opioid painkillers—along with numerous other psychoactive
medications78—tops world rankings.79 Americans’ love affair with opioids has

72

See generally THERESE C. FITZGERALD ET AL., MASS. MED. SOC’Y, ESTABLISHMENT
PILOT MEDICALLY SUPERVISED INJECTION FACILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS (2017); see
also MASS. HARM REDUCTION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 13 (2019), https://www.mass.gov/
doc/harm-reduction-commission-report-3-1-2019/download [http://perma.cc/UB9B-VV7C]
(noting that facilities have well-documented benefits in preventing overdose, addressing
infectious disease associated with drug injection, and addressing community problems
related to open-air drug use). Over 100 SCFs operate worldwide, with numerous facilities
now emerging in Canada in response to that country’s overdose crisis. Zachary Siegel, It’s
Time to Bring Supervised Injection Sites Above Ground, UNDARK (Jan. 11, 2018),
[hereinafter
Siegel,
Supervised
Injection
Sites
Above
Ground]
https://undark.org/article/supervised-injection-sites-study/ [http://perma.cc/D9GH-6N52].
Despite the mounting burden of overdose and its negative health and societal impact, no
authorized SCF currently exists in the U.S. See id.
73
Siegel, Supervised Injection Sites Above Ground, supra note 72.
74
Carl Hart, People Are Dying Because of Ignorance, Not Opioids, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1,
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/people-are-dying-because-of-ignorancenot-because-of-opioids/ [http://perma.cc/7S3W-C2X3].
75
See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A
BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH (2011).
76
See id. at 4. Cf. Richard L. Nahin, Estimates of Pain Prevalence and Severity in
Adults: United States, 2012, 16 J. PAIN 769, 769, 775–76 (2015) (noting that 25.3 million
adults (11.2%) complain of daily (chronic) pain and 23.4 million adults (10.3%) complain
of a lot of pain).
77
DAVID G. BLANCHFLOWER & ANDREW OSWALD, INST. OF L ABOR ECON., NO. 11184,
UNHAPPINESS AND PAIN IN MODERN AMERICA: A REVIEW ESSAY, AND FURTHER EVIDENCE,
ON CAROL GRAHAM’ S HAPPINESS FOR ALL? 16 (2017).
78
See Maia Szalavitz, The Mystery of the Terrifying Xanax Resurgence in America,
VICE (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/paxg39/the-mystery-of-theterrifying-xanaxresurgence-in-america [https://perma.cc/XPU4-8TVY].
79
See generally Winfried Häuser et al., The Opioid Epidemic and the Long-Term
Opioid Therapy for Chronic Noncancer Pain Revisited: A Transatlantic Perspective, 6 PAIN
MGMT. 249 (2016); see also Dina Gusovsky, Americans Consume Vast Majority of the
OF A
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experienced at least three previous cycles of booms and panics, followed by periods
of recoil.80 Addiction and other collateral negative consequences of opioid use are
not novel public policy concerns.81 Nevertheless, broad public recognition and
sustained interest in overdose are new.82
What is deemed a drug “crisis” or “epidemic” worthy of concerted public policy
focus is evidently arbitrary.83 Even at its current—and projected—shocking levels,84
opioid-involved overdoses kill far fewer Americans per year than other drugs.
Yearly, alcohol-related overdose and disease are linked to approximately 88,000
U.S. fatalities,85 while tobacco is responsible for a shocking 480,000 American
deaths.86 Though certainly noteworthy in human and financial terms, these critical
public health issues receive far less legislative or media attention.87
For decades, rising drug overdoses were of only niche concern. Although long
endemic in certain urban and rural communities,88 public apathy towards overdose

World’s Opioids, CNBC (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/27/americansconsume-almost-all-of-the-global-opioid-supply.html [http://perma.cc/FX92-EWSN].
80
See PEMBELTON, supra note 43, at 4–6; see also DAVID MUSTO ET AL., ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN xiii–xvi, 3–13 (2002).
81
See PEMBELTON, supra note 43, at 4–6.
82
Scott Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision of
Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 273, 274–76 (2009) (noting the
number of high-profile deaths from heroin or prescription drug overdose over the course of
the last several decades of the twentieth century, and the corresponding lack of action to
address this issue).
83
See generally Taleed El-Sabawi, Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure
Groups, and Problem Definition, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 1357 (2018).
84
See Max Blau, STAT Forecast: Opioids Could Kill Nearly 500,000 Americans in the
Next Decade, STAT (June 27, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/27/opioid-deathsforecast/ [http://perma.cc/S2V6-YEH4].
85
Alcohol and Public Health: Alcohol-Related Disease Impact (ARDI), CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://nccd.cdc.gov/DPH_ARDI/Default/Report.aspx?
T=AAM&P=f6d7eda7-036e-4553-9968-9b17ffad620e&R=d7a9b303-48e9-4440-bf47-070
a4827e1fd&M=8E1C5233-5640-4EE8-9247-1ECA7DA325B9&F=&D= [https://perma.cc/
AR6N-2GVN].
86
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2014).
87
See German Lopez, The Deadlier Drug Crises that We Don’t Consider Public Health
Emergencies, VOX (Oct. 27, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/10/27/16557550/alcohol-tobacco-opioids-epidemic-emergency [https://perma
.cc/K3E5-THMP].
88
See Jose A. Del Real, The Bronx’s Quiet, Brutal War with Opioids, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/nyregion/bronx-heroin-fentanyl-opioidoverdoses.html [http://perma.cc/A7J8-ZMEW]; see also Theodore J. Cicero et al., The
Changing Face of Heroin Use in the United States: A Retrospective Analysis of the Past Fifty
Years, 71 J. AM. MED. ASS’N PSYCHIATRY 821, 822 (2014).
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was pervasive, only to be interrupted by tragic celebrity deaths.89 Meanwhile, by
framing heroin and nonmedical opioid use as a moral failing,90 criminal law codified
societal stigma and stunted public health and other effective response to this longstanding problem.91
In the late 2000s, this apathy would give way to increasing visibility and alarm,
as overdose deaths grew in number and shifted beyond their prior confinement to
geographical and demographic realms of concentrated disadvantage.92 The rapid and
unexpected pace of this diffusion explains the popularity of the moniker “epidemic”
being used to describe the phenomenon. As explored in detail elsewhere,93 this
figurative use of the word conjures up a literal contagion. By invoking this framing,
thought leaders, members of the media, and the public embraced a discursive vision
of the overdose crisis as being fueled by prescription medications and health care
providers as vectors of a contagion.94
When it comes to framing public policy narratives, language matters.95 As
discussed in more detail elsewhere, the vector narrative foregrounds opioid supply,
with a root cause analysis that focuses on overprescription of opioid painkillers. This
narrative faults the health care system for its well-intentioned, but misguided efforts
to better address undertreated pain.96 Its prototypical villain is the pharmaceutical

89
See Burris et al., supra note 82, at 273–75; see also Ledger’s Death Caused by
Accidental Overdose, CNN (Feb. 6, 2008, 10:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/SHOW
BIZ/Movies/02/06/heath.ledger/index.html [http://perma.cc/XVU7-8TMX] (noting Heath
Ledger, a well-known Hollywood actor, famously died of an accidental overdose after
consuming a combination of opioid analgesics and benzodiazepines). See generally
Nonpharmaceutical Fentanyl-Related Deaths–Multiple States, April 2005–March 2007, 57
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 793
(2008), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5729a1.htm [http://perma.cc/
72S5-SHQ3] (documenting prior outbreak of fentanyl-related deaths in what would be the
precursor to the current fentanyl crisis); Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug
Monitoring to Address the Overdose Crisis: Ideology Meets Reality, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
139, 155–58 (2018) [hereinafter Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring].
90
See Julie Netherland & Helena Hansen, White Opioids: Pharmaceutical Race and
the War on Drugs that Wasn’t, 12 BIOSOCIETIES 217, 217–38 (2017).
91
See Katharine A. Neill, Tough on Drugs: Law and Order Dominance and the Neglect
of Public Health in U.S. Drug Policy, 6 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 375, 375–77 (2014).
92
See Cicero et al., supra note 88, at 822, 825; Julie Netherland & Helena B. Hansen,
The War on Drugs that Wasn’t: Wasted Whiteness, “Dirty Doctors,” and Race in Media
Coverage of Prescription Opioid Misuse, 40 CULTURE, MED., & PSYCHIATRY 664, 665–70
(2016).
93
Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic
Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–83 (2018).
94
Id.
95
See El-Sabawi, supra note 83, at 1364–68.
96
See Dasgupta et al., supra note 93, at 184.
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industry, whose malfeasance97 and regulatory capture98 helped exploit gaps in
provider education99 and perverse incentives.100 These efforts did in fact sharply
boost utilization of opioid analgesics,101 making them the first-line treatment for
many types of pain.102 In 1999, accidental opioid poisonings began to grow in
tandem.103 This ushered in the era of the so-called “prescription drug epidemic” and
subsequent remedial policy and programmatic interventions.104
By 2010, the year Joshua Banka reportedly shifted his opioid use from
prescription drugs to heroin, the crisis entered its second phase. Driven by a variety
of pull and push factors, use of opioid prescription drugs began transitioning to street

97

Katie Zezima & Lenny Bernstein, Lawsuit Claims Sackler Family Disregarded
Safety, Opioid Addiction in Purdue Push to Profit from OxyContin, WASH. POST (Feb. 1,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/lawsuit-claims-sackler-familydisregarded-safety-opioid-addiction-in-purdue-push-to-profit-from-oxycontin/2019/02/01/5
d29e072-2660-11e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc17_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bf04c84
d2054 [http://perma.cc/QL8B-U6P9]; see also Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription
Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 566 (2015), https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annu
rev-publhealth-031914-122957 [http://perma.cc/8E4U-BG8U].
98
Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, Investigation: The Drug Industry’s Triumph over
the DEA, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/
investigations/dea-drug-industry-congress/?utm_term=.8af982716f8f [https://perma.cc/9R
JY-Q9DZ].
99
Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., Overdose Education and Naloxone for Patients
Prescribed Opioids in Primary Care: A Qualitative Study of Primary Care Staff, 30 J. GEN.
INT. MED. 1837, 1839 (2015).
100
Jane C. Ballantyne & Mark D. Sullivan, Intensity of Chronic Pain — The Wrong
Metric?, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2098, 2098–99 (2015).
101
Gery Guy Jr. et al., Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the United States,
2006–2015, 66 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 703 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6626a4.htm?s_
cid=mm6626a4_w [http://perma.cc/5BJU-UR3S].
102
Gabe Gutierrez et al., Welcome to Williamson, W.Va., Where There Are 6,500
Opioid Pills Per Person, NBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:59 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/welcome-williamson-w-va-where-there-are-6500-opioid-n843821 [http://perma.cc/E2WT-4LGY]; Kristine Phillips, The Pill Mill Doctor
Who Prescribed Thousands of Opioids and Billed Dead Patients, WASH. POST (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/09/22/deceitful-pillmill-doctor-who-prescribed-thousands-of-opioids-and-billed-dead-patients-settles-civillawsuit/?utm_term=.6fbfa7b87b36 [http://perma.cc/3LSL-WCRP].
103
Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Overdoses of Presciption Opioid Pain
Relievers – United States, 1999–2008, 60 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1487 (2011).
104
See generally DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY, PARADOX, AND POLITICAL REASON
(1988).
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opioids like heroin and counterfeit pills.105 In the context of the ever-more restrictive
policy and logistical barriers to prescription drug access, individuals dependent on—
or addicted to—opioids found alternatives on the street.106 At that juncture, despite
decades of investment in drug-control measures at home and abroad, illicit
alternatives to prescription opioids were widely available in many U.S.
communities.107
Once exposed to clandestine supply chains,108 people using opioids saw their
overdose and other health risk skyrocket.109 Around 2014, the crisis entered its third,
most deadly, current phase: Illicitly manufactured fentanyl—a far more potent
opioid than heroin—began to dominate the black-market supply.110 Deaths linked to
this and other synthetic analogues began their stratospheric rise, nearly tripling
within a short time.111 This deadly climb continues, largely uncontained, to this
day.112
Under the vector model, contagion containment efforts focus on tracing and
eliminating the disease agent and its vehicles—or vectors.113 Both public health and
criminal justice policies draw heavily on this model in framing drug-related
105

See Dasgupta et al., supra note 93, at 183–84; see also Beletsky, Deploying
Prescription Drug Monitoring, supra note 89, at 155.
106
See Zachary Siegel, “Safer” OxyContin Caused Thousands of Heroin Deaths,
Researchers Find, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 14, 2017, 12:15 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/
safer-oxycontin-caused-thousands-of-heroin-deaths-researchers-find [http://perma.cc/HY4
W-W96X] (reporting of a study that demonstrated abuse-deterrent reformulation of
prescription opioid pain relievers caused a mass exodus of users to transition into using
injection heroin).
107
Id.; Daniel Rosenblum et al., The Entry of Colombian-Sourced Heroin into the US
Market: The Relationship between Competition, Price, and Purity, 25 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y
1, 88–95 (2014).
108
Nicholas Kristof, ‘Drug Dealers in Lab Coats’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/opioid-pharmaceutical-addiction-pain.html
[http://perma.cc/CM9S-XFQ9].
109
Dita Broz et al., Multiple Injections Per Injection Episode: High-Risk Injection
Practice Among People Who Injected Pills During the 2015 HIV Outbreak in Indiana, 52
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 97, 97–101 (2018).
110
Katherine Hempstead & Emel O. Yildirim, Supply-side Response to Declining
Heroin Purity: Fentanyl Overdose Episode in New Jersey, 23 HEALTH ECON. 688, 688–705
(2014); see also Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron
Law, Revisited, 46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 156, 157 (2017).
111
Daniel Ciccarone, Fentanyl in the US Heroin Supply: A Rapidly Changing Risk
Environment, 46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 107, 107–111 (2017).
112
Id.
113
Robert Lowes, CDC Issues Opioid Guidelines for ‘Doctor-Driven’ Epidemic,
MEDSCAPE (2016), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/860452 [https://perma.cc/G2M8
-G23K] (noting that the former Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Dr. Thomas Frieden, declared the overdose crisis as “doctor driven,” and could therefore be
reversed by prescribing fewer opioids).
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problems. This view of complex sociostructural problems reinforces simplistic
public policy approaches.114 By narrowly defining the “opioid epidemic” as a purely
supply-driven phenomenon, decision-makers overlooked proven prevention and
response tools.115 These missteps led the crisis to morph from bad to worse.
The “epidemic” narrative is problematic insomuch as it deflects focus from the
true scope and causes of the crisis. Take, for example, the structure and function of
the healthcare and health insurance systems and the role they have played in the
etiology of this crisis. The gaps in access; the high cost; the poor quality; and the
poor cultural competence in provision of physical, mental, and behavioral health
services116 all increase an individual’s demand for opioid analgesia.117 In fact,
economic distress, social isolation, concentrated disadvantage, occupational stress,
and numerous other factors all contribute to demand for physical and emotional
relief offered by opioids.118 To be clear, high opioid utilization and overdose are
symptoms of structural dysfunction in American society.
Instead of a renewed focus on such systems-level factors, policy response to
the crisis has been principally operationalized through a suite of supply-side
interventions of unclear utility, including the deployment of prescription limits,
114

See Zachary Siegel, Is the U.S. Knee-Deep in Epidemics? Or Is that Just Wishful
Thinking?, N.Y. TIMES (2018), [hereinafter Siegel, U.S. Knee-Deep in Epidemics?]
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/magazine/epidemic-disaster-tragedy.html [http://
perma.cc/YLZ4-WMVH] (arguing that the term epidemic has been incorrectly applied to
various social and health problems, leading policy down the wrong path of flawed solutions).
115
See Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring, supra note 89, at 158–60;
see also Dasgupta et al., supra note 93; Siegel, U.S. Knee-Deep in Epidemics?, supra note
114; Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Conference Report, Brookings Panel on Economic
Activity, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century (March 23–24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/6_casedeaton.pdf [http://perma.cc
/YAK6-UB97] (“The epidemic spread from the southwest, where it was centered in 2000,
first to Appalachia, Florida and the west coast by the mid-2000s, and is now country-wide.”);
KENNETH D. KOCHANEK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF No. 293, MORTALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2016, at 1 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db293.pdf
[http://perma.cc/59ML-CR7H]. These patterns have been both spurred by—and have
paradoxically accelerated—government austerity and deregulatory policies. See generally
Arne Ruckert & Ronald Labonté, Health Inequalities in the Age of Austerity: The Need for
Social Protections Policies, 187 SOC. SCI. & MED. 306, 307–09 (2017) (tracing the diffusion
of declining life expectancy patterns from their origins in highly-disadvantaged groups and
geographic locales has traced the expansion of economic and social fissures in the fabric of
American society).
116
Ling Ding et al., Predictors and Consequences of Negative Physician Attitudes
Toward HIV-Infected Injection Drug Users, 165 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 618,
618–23 (2005).
117
Sarah Bowman et al., Reducing the Health Consequences of Opioid Addiction in
Primary Care, 126 AM. J. MED. 565, 565–66 (2013).
118
Dasgupta et al., supra note 93, at 182–86.
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prescription drug monitoring systems, and prosecutions of providers and patients.119
These policy interventions to restrict opioid supply in the healthcare arena have
caused the pendulum of access to swing rapidly in the opposite direction.120 Applied
to—deservedly unsympathetic—pharmaceutical companies, narratives focused on
corporate malfeasance have generated enormous momentum for litigation.121 The
resulting “riptide” has engendered problems in providing adequate care for pain
patients and maintaining patient engagement, explaining the transition to the black
market.122
In the context of the overdose crisis, a rhetorical shift towards a “public health
approach” began to take shape. However, as the next Part will show, this framing
has been co-opted by the false promises of supply reduction. This has expanded the
space for criminal justice measures such as drug-induced homicide, along with
involuntary commitment statutes and others, to be recast into the role of publichealth-oriented approaches.
II. THE DRUG CONTROL REGIME AND ITS ROLE IN THE OVERDOSE CRISIS
A. The Origins of the U.S. Drug Control
The first hundred years in the Republic’s history were characterized by a
relatively permissive regime for the use of drugs for medicinal and recreational
purposes.123 Around the turn of the twentieth century, social, cultural, and economic
119

Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring, supra note 89, at 114.
Kurt Kroenke & Andrea Cheville, Opinion, Management of Chronic Pain in the
Aftermath of the Opioid Backlash, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2365, 2365 (2017).
121
Derek Carr et al., Reducing Harm Through Litigation Against Opioid
Manufacturers? Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 207, 208–10
(2018) (explaining how such litigation, though promising in terms of litigators’ access to
corporate deep pockets, will likely have limited impact on the crisis of overdose deaths, in
both the immediate and longer-term future); see also Leo Beletsky, The Benefits and
Potential Drawbacks in the Approval of EVZIO for Reversal of Opioid Overdose, 48 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 357, 357–59 (2015) (explaining how aside from crowding out attention
to meaningful solutions to the overdose crisis, this framing also obscures broader, systemic
problems with how the pharmaceutical industry is regulated, as illustrated in the pricing of
the opioid antidote naloxone); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription
Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858
(2016) (explaining how problems with pharmaceutical malfeasance and deregulation go far
beyond the narrow set of concerns at issue in the opioid lawsuits).
122
Alison Knopf, Patients with Chronic Pain Forced into Opioid Tapers by Their
Prescribers, 30 ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE WKLY. 1, 1–2 (2018); see also Sally Satel & Stefan
G. Kertesz, Opioid Prescription Control: When the Corrective Goes Too Far, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.aei.org/publication/opioid-prescription-control-whenthe-corrective-goes-too-far/ [https://perma.cc/9LEX-AK8L].
123
See generally RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL
HISTORY OF NARCOTICS 1500–2000 (2001) (explaining changes in U.S. drug laws from the
120
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concerns spurred increasing efforts to regulate psychoactive substances.124 In large
part, these efforts were animated by disciplinarian and moralistic impulses
operationalized through commodity control instruments.125 In concert with the
evolution of policy and enforcement regimes in the alcohol realm during Prohibition,
criminal law and law enforcement came to dominate efforts to reduce drug-related
harms.126
The popularity of opioids saw several booms and busts, eliciting public concern
and an increasingly restrictive regulatory regime.127 The first major federal statute
to construct a punitive framework to control opioid consumption was the Harrison
Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, which established a system for Pigouvian taxation and
supply controls.128 The same law and subsequent jurisprudence129 also misguidedly
placed severe restrictions on the prescription of heroin for opioid maintenance—a
measure that had been effectively employed by U.S. physicians to reduce the
negative consequences of addiction.130
During the Vietnam Era, public concern about the use of psychoactive
substances and their wide availability through illicit supply chains led to the passage
of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),131 which marked a substantial shift in drug

late 19th Century through the early 20th Century); DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK
PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA (2001) (explaining changes and
developments in opioid use among Americans between the late 19th and early 20th
Centuries); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
(1973) (discussing opioid use in 19th Century America); David Musto, Opium, Cocaine and
Marijuana in American History, 265 SCI. AM. 40 (1991) (providing additional analysis
regarding opioid use prior to and during the 19th Century as compared to the present day).
124
DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 123.
125
Id.
126
See MUSTO ET AL., supra note 80.
127
Jessica Glenza, America’s Opioid Epidemic Began More than a Century Ago – With
the
Civil
War,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
30,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/dec/30/americas-opioid-epidemic-began-morethan-a-century-ago-with-the-civil-war [http://perma.cc/2C9V-92LN] (noting that the first
such boom occurred in response to massive trauma of the Civil War and the upheaval
wrought by the Industrial Revolution); Editorial, An Opioid Crisis Foretold, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/opinion/an-opioid-crisisforetold.html [http://perma.cc/B5KW-MDXR].
128
Harrison Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
129
See generally United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916); Webb v. United
States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
130
See Webb, 249 U.S. at 99.
131
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2018)).
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regulation.132 The CSA established a distinct architecture for the regulation of certain
drugs, based on their “accepted medical use” and “potential for abuse.”133
Long before President Nixon’s famous proclamation of drugs as “public enemy
number one,”134 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) had done considerable work
to construct social panics over drug exposure.135 These deep roots set the stage for
1973 when, as part of this major overhaul, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
FBN, and other agencies ceded legal and functional authority over many
enforcement activities to the much more powerful, and newly created Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).136 Using its consolidated power, the DEA
would be charged with using criminal justice tools to suppress the illicit production
and trafficking of drugs in the United States.137 The DEA would also curate a risk
schedule and a “closed system” for pharmaceutical products deemed to have
substantial addictive potential in order to prevent their misuse and diversion.138
With this commodity problem focus, U.S. drug control came to be organized
around two categories of policy and enforcement interventions: supply reduction
and demand reduction.139 Reflective of the Law and Economics framing, this model
focuses on microeconomic levers to calibrate the relationship between supply,
demand, price, and quantity.140 It employs administrative and criminal law tools to
maintain the supply chains141 for controlled substances, with extensive controls on
their availability in health care settings to prevent misuse and diversion.142
132
Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, FRONTLINE (2000),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/
[http://perma.cc/AB8JR7BJ].
133
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2018).
134
Conor Friedersdorf, The War on Drugs Turns 40, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/the-war-on-drugs-turns-40/240472/
[https://perma.cc/V7R7-G2VR]; see also PEMBELTON, supra note 43, at 25.
135
PEMBELTON, supra note 43, at 25–26.
136
Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Drug Enforcement Administration,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-andfunctions-manual-drug-enforcement-administration [http://perma.cc/9RP5-TLQ4].
137
Id.
138
Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug
info/ds.shtml [http://perma.cc/8NSD-E5G5].
139
See Community Outreach, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
https://www.dea.gov/community-outreach
[https://perma.cc/BKE8-XLAM]
(“DEA
recognizes that not only reducing the quantity (supply) of drugs is essential to a safe and drug
free country, but also reducing the desire (demand) for illicit drugs is a vital component to
effectively reduce drug use in our Nation.”).
140
See generally HUBERT HENDERSON, SUPPLY AND DEMAND (1922).
141
U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., PHARMACIST’S MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE
OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 30 (2010), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/
pubs/manuals/pharm2/pharm_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CCH-X3QZ].
142
Id.; see also Jane C. Ballantyne, Regulation of Opioid Prescribing, 33 BRITISH MED.
J. 811 (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1853184/ [http://perma.cc
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There is little evidence that DEA efforts to monitor and regulate prescription
and pharmacy practices as they relate to controlled substances have helped achieve
a balance between adequate access and diversion control.143 The DEA closely tracks
and exerts active authority over manufacturer, distributor, prescriber, and pharmacist
practices.144 Yet, starting in the late 1990s, it failed to effectively respond to
skyrocketing production, distribution, and clinical overreliance on opioid
analgesics.145
Regulatory capture is a pervasive problem in the pharmaceutical space.146 This,
however, was not the principal culprit behind the DEA’s dismal performance in
preventing and responding to the mounting overdose crisis.147 In the years since the
establishment of this drug control framework, the availability and purity of illicit
substances on the American black market have only increased, while their prices
have fallen.148 Ultimately, supply reduction interventions employed—and
supported—by the United States have resulted in major collateral detriment in

/E2TL-NVMF].
143
See M. Mofizul Islam Ian & S. McRae, Commentary, An Inevitable Wave of
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs in the Context of Prescription Opioids: Pros, Cons
and Tensions, 15 BMC PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 1, 4–5 (2014),
https://bmcpharmacoltoxicol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/2050-6511-15-46
[http://perma.cc/7R47-Z2Q4].
144
Ronald J. Friedman, DEA Audits: “Coming to a Theatre Near You,” 8 AM. BAR
ASS’N HEALTH ESOURCE 1 (2011); see also Michael Gabay, Federal Controlled Substances
Act: Dispensing Requirements, Electronic Prescriptions, and Fraudulent Prescriptions, 49
HOSP. PHARMACY 244, 244–45 (2014).
145
RONALD T. LIBBY, CATO INSTITUTE, POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 545, TREATING
DOCTORS AS DRUG DEALERS: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY’S WAR ON PRESCRIPTION
PAINKILLERS 4 (2005).
146
See Lenny Bernstein & Scott Higham, ‘We feel like our system was hijacked’: DEA
Agents say a Huge Opioid Case Ended in a Whimper, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/mckesson-dea-opioids-fine/2017/12/14/ab
50ad0e-db5b-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html?utm_term=.3ff4d0130326
[http://perma.cc/6T39-DYDC].
147
Leo Beletsky & Jeremiah Goulka, Opinion, The Federal Agency that Fuels the
Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/opinion
/drugs-dea-defund-heroin.html [https://perma.cc/A4YM-4QPV] (“The [DEA] has been
unable to balance legitimate access to and control of prescription drugs.”).
148
Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law,
Revisited, 46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 156, 157 (2017); see also Dan Werb et al., The Temporal
Relationship Between Drug Supply Indicators: An Audit of International Government
Surveillance
Systems,
3
BRITISH
MED.
J.
OPEN
1
(2013),
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/3/9/e003077.full.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AD2DKT2S] (showing the supply of illegal drugs has increased through a decline in price and
increase in drug purity).
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spheres of overdose, injection-related blood-borne infection, drug-related violence,
and mass incarceration.149
The impact of drug control policy on the explosion of the U.S. penal system
cannot be understated. Since the 1980s, the number of Americans behind bars has
risen by 500 percent.150 At the peak of the national incarceration boom in 2008, there
were more than seven million adults cycling in and out of U.S. jails and prisons.151
Although this number has seen a recent decline, 6.5 million adults currently remain
under the control of the criminal justice system, with 70 percent on probation and
parole.152 A substantial proportion of this turbo-charged carceral paradigm is
attributed to the “War on Drugs,”153 as well as to the sharp defunding and
dismantling of publicly financed mental health treatment, substance use treatment,
and other social safety net resources.154 Many of those in the criminal justice system
meet the clinical definition of substance use disorders and exhibit mental health
comorbidities.155
Racial and economic disparities also underscore mass incarceration. In 2010,
individuals sentenced to state prisons for drug-related crimes were
disproportionately poor people of color.156 Evidence that economically

149
Joanne Csete et al., Public Health and International Drug Policy, 387 LANCET
COMMISSIONS 1427, 1427–28 (2016).
150
LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, UPDATE:
CHANGES IN STATE IMPRISONMENT 1 (June 7, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites
/default/files/analysis/UpdateChangesinStateImprisonment.pdf
[http://perma.cc/45UMCLPY].
151
LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 239972, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH99-NY86].
152
DANIELE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZU4-8CMU].
153
See ALEXANDER, supra note 45, at 6. Although drug-related charges account for a
relatively minor proportion of the overall carceral burden, weapon, property, parole violation
and other charges ancillary to drug crimes make up a substantial portion of the carceral
burden. See generally JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 21–50 (2017).
154
KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POL’Y STUDIES, THE POOR GET PRISON:
THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 12–14 (2015), https://ipshttps://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X877-92UB].
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Id. at 14.
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E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 7 tbl.7 (2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf [http://perma.cc/D9Z2-PLL7].

2019]

DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE

855

disadvantaged individuals157 and minority individuals158 are not systematically more
likely to misuse drugs or engage in drug-related crimes underscores the gross and
systemic injustice of these disparities.
B. Criminalizing Addiction: From “Diseased Soul” to “Brain Disease”
The use of substances to alter the human condition is as old as civilization
itself.159 Alcohol and other intoxicating substances were a core part of the American
colonial experience—as medicinal, recreational, and performance-enhancing
agents.160 The Industrial Revolution’s focus on productivity and discipline, however,
began to bolster existing moralistic attitudes towards excessive substance use.161
Enmeshed in increasing concerns about poverty, crime, and truancy in quickly
urbanizing society, the “diseased soul”162 view of addiction invoked criminal law
responses.163 Racialized and xenophobic sentiments further bolstered the framing of
addiction as deviant, and antisocial;164 the impulse for increased control paved the
way for the Temperance Movement and the evolution of laws criminalizing various
aspects of drug and alcohol at the local, state, and federal levels.165
It took decades for the scientific consensus to evolve from the conception of
problematic substance use as a moral and character defect. Advances in psychology
and other scientific disciplines gradually shifted this understanding towards a
medicalized view, framing addiction as an actual disease, rather than a moral one.
One codification of this evolution was the classification of addiction as a
psychological disorder by the American Psychological Association with the
publication of its first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1952.166
157

See Jennifer L. Humensky, Are Adolescents with High Socioeconomic Status More
Likely to Engage in Alcohol and Illicit Drug Use in Early Adulthood?, 5 SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT, PREVENTION, AND POL’Y 1, 7–8 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2924306/pdf/1747-597X-5-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U9N-458R].
158
See Li-Tzy Wu et al., Racial/Ethnic Variations in Substance-Related Disorders
Among Adolescents in the United States, 68 J. AM. MED. ASS’N GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1176,
1181–84 (2011).
159
Sean M. Robinson & Bryon Adinoff, The Classification of Substance Use
Disorders: Historical, Contextual, and Conceptual Considerations, 6 BEHAV. SCI. 18, 20
fig.1 (2016) (outlining the role of drugs and alcohol in ancient civilizations).
160
Id. at 2–7 (describing the use of opium and cocaine in patent medicines, the complex
relationship between religion and alcohol use, as well as the provision of cocaine to slaves
to boost cotton production).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 7.
163
Id.
164
Id. (noting for instance, the trope of the “negro cocaine fiend” popular in the 19th
century).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 20 fig.1 (depicting the evolution of the definition of substance use
disorder/addiction).
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This evolving understanding soon found its way into American jurisprudence.
For instance, the 1962 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. California struck
down a law criminalizing addiction on Eighth Amendment grounds.167 In a
fragmented opinion, the Court held that it is cruel and unusual to criminalize
addiction because it is an “illness.”168 Since Robinson, scientific advances in the
understanding of problematic substance use have accelerated, though new
knowledge has been slow to enter the realm of criminal law.
The dominant empirical view of substance use disorder is the “brain disease
model of addiction” (BDMA), which faults impairments in the structure and
function of the brain for poor impulse control.169 But critics of the BDMA point to
the importance of situational, environmental, and other factors, sometimes decrying
the overreliance on “reductionist” brain pathology to explain a complex
sociophysiological phenomenon.170 An evolving framework integrates these views
as complementary, rather than oppositional, by considering how a variety of
environmental and situational stressors may neurologically impact impulsivity
control and related brain function.171
Although this debate continues to evolve, there is broad agreement that severe
substance use disorder (SUD) is a chronic illness, characterized by relapse and the
rejection of a curative frame.172 Critical to this discussion is that addiction—now
defined as severe SUD—is characterized by continued, compulsive drug use despite
negative consequences.173 Such consequences include employment, family, or other
problems resulting from drug consumption.174 In other words, the established
167

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
Id. (“It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it
a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal
disease. A State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims
of these . . . afflictions be dealt with compulsory treatment, involving quarantine,
confinement, or sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to
be an inclination of cruel and unusual punishment . . . .”).
169
See Nora D. Volkow et al., Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model
of Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363, 365 (2016); see also Nick Heather, Q: Is Addiction
a Brain Disease or a Moral Failing? A: Neither, 10 NEUROETHICS 115, 115–23 (2017).
170
See Heather, supra note 169, at 120–21.
171
Id.
172
Richard Saitz et al., The Case for Chronic Disease Management for Addiction, 2 J.
ADDICTION MED. 55, 55 (2008) (“Like other chronic diseases (e.g, diabetes, congestive heart
failure), substance dependence has no cure and is characterized by relapses requiring
longitudinal care.”); see also A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Addiction as a Chronic
Medical Illness: Implications for Treatment, Insurance and Evaluation, 284 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1689, 1689 (2000).
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The Science of Drug Use and Addiction: The Basics, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE 1
(2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/media-guide/science-drug-use-addictionbasics [http://perma.cc/EHF5-GR5B].
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Id. at 2.
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scientific consensus predicts that individuals affected by addiction will substantially
discount—or totally disregard—legal risks and threats of punishment as a matter of
course. Without needing to engage complex philosophical and epistemological
questions about conceptions of free will and decisional capacity,175 a system that
relies on the instrument of punishment to regulate the behavior of people affected
by severe SUD fundamentally misconstrues the nature of addiction.176
This scientific construct has yet to be translated into U.S. jurisprudence,
however. Although Robinson introduced a minor crack in the conception that
criminal law is a constitutionally appropriate instrument to address problematic
substance use, U.S. criminal law and its judicial stewards have proved unreceptive
to further efforts to disrupt the status quo: Despite a number of attempts, Robinson
has been distinguished away in subsequent jurisprudence that has attempted to
challenge the constitutionality of criminal laws that punish conduct emanating from
SUD.177
The most prominent of such cases in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, Powell
v. Texas,178 is broadly understood to have held that an actus reus resulting from
addiction could be criminalized whereas a simple propensity could not.179 It bears
noting, however, this case was decided by a 5–4 vote.180 In the dissent, four justices
persuasively articulated the view that criminal laws punishing addicted individuals
175

See, e.g., Dilip V. Jeste & Elyn Saks, Decisional Capacity in Mental Illness and
Substance Use Disorders: Empirical Database and Policy Implications, 24 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 607, 621–23 (2006).
176
Evidence supporting negative incentives and punishment in order to modify the
behavior of people with addiction is substantially based on studies of limited generalizability.
See, e.g., Robert L. DuPont et al., Setting the Standard for Recovery: Physicians’ Health
Programs, 36 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 159, 165 (2009) (finding successful
research in physician substance use treatment programs that use the threat of losing one’s
medical license as an incentive). Considering what it takes to become a physician in the
United States, individuals in this profession are systematically selected for those who are the
best equipped for impulse control and delayed gratification. Physicians are also supported
by social, economic, and other systems that are a far cry from what is available to the average
American.
177
See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 514 (1968) (declining to invalidate a Texas
law criminalizing public intoxication). Attempts to use this decision to invalidate substance
use-related laws have also proven futile. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Margo, 191 A.2d 43, 45
(N.J. 1963) (declining to invalidate a state statute that criminalized “being under the
influence”); Salas v. Texas, 365 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (declining to
invalidate a similar “under the influence” state statute); State v. Brown, 440 P.2d 909, 910–
11 (Ariz. 1968) (declining to invalidate a statute that criminalized “use,” rather than
“addiction”); see also Brief on Behalf of the Mass. Med. Soc’y as Amicus Curiae at 47,
Massachusetts v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911 (Mass. 2018) (urging the court to consider the SUD
is a chronic disease and is not effectively addressed by incarceration).
178
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
179
Id. at 533.
180
Id. at 516–17.
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for conduct resulting from the “pattern of [their] disease” violates the Eighth
Amendment.181 It is remarkable just how narrowly that view missed becoming the
guiding principle of U.S. criminal law in 1968.182 By reviving this line of
constitutional argument, litigation emerging out of the overdose crisis has the
potential to bring some long-overdue change to this doctrinal realm.
C. Legal and Policy Responses to the Overdose Crisis
As a reflection of this historical and doctrinal context, the U.S. response to the
overdose crisis has been primarily focused on suppression of opioid supply, with a
distinct emphasis on criminal law tools.183 Reflecting the “vector model,” this
response has drawn on multipronged policy and programmatic efforts to roll back
patient access to opioids.184 The structural determinant framework makes clear,
however, that the opioid overdose crisis did not arise solely—or even principally—
as a consequence of lax, unscrupulous prescribing and pharmaceutical marketing.185
Framing health care providers and pharmaceutical companies as “pushers”186 calls
up a familiar but misleading War-on-Drugs trope that glosses over critical structural
issues that helped spark and sustain overdose morbidity and mortality.187

181
Id. at 567–68 (“The statute [prohibiting public drunkenness] covers more than a
mere status [at issue in Robinson]. But the essential constitutional defect here is the same as
in Robinson, for in both cases the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition
which he had no capacity to change or avoid.”).
182
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45 (2013).
183
Abby Alpert et al., Supply-Side Drug Policy in the Presence of Substitutes: Evidence
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Working Paper No. 23031, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23031 [http://perma.cc/
E56Y-6WVZ].
184
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& DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrug
Class/ucm337852.htm [http://perma.cc/C7UP-8T69]; Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for
Chronic Pain, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugover
dose/pdf/Guidelines_Factsheet-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ37-QWYL]; Opioid Analgesic
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/opioid-analgesic-risk-evaluation-andmitigation-strategy-rems [http://perma.cc/6Y58-4SFP]; Jan L. Losby et al., Safer and More
Appropriate Opioid Prescribing: A Large Healthcare System’s Comprehensive Approach,
23 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 1173 (2017).
185
Dasgupta et al., supra note 93, at 182.
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Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic: Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were
Widely Abused, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/
purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html [https://perma.cc/6WA6-784X].
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Providers experience both internal and external pressure to sharply reduce
opioid prescribing.188 Mechanisms like patient contracts and random drug tests,
when considered in combination with prescription monitoring efforts, aggravated
stigmatization of substance users in health care settings, injecting suspicion and
distrust within the provider-patient relationship.189 Faced with the risk of judgment
and criminalization, patients with unmet physical or mental health needs would be
deterred from seeking care altogether.190
For the many opioid users whose dependence had been already established,
efforts to rapidly restrict access proved catastrophic.191 Inadvertently, but
predictably, this strategy led many patients to transition from legitimate opioid
supplies to black market supplies.192 Opioid dependence and addiction did not
simply recede with the contraction in the availability of opioid pills. Unintended, but
foreseeable,193 this transition from health care settings exposed users to much a
higher risk of overdose because of the lack of regulation over the quality and dosage
in black market opioid products.194

188
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ENG. J. MED. 691, 691–92 (2018), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1713159
[http://perma.cc/B7SU-DBJD].
189
Id.; see also Joanna L. Starrels et al., Systematic Review: Treatment Agreements and
Urine Drug Testing to Reduce Opioid Misuse in Patients with Chronic Pain, 152 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 712, 715–17 (2010).
190
Jay Baruch, Did I Just Feed an Addiction? Or Ease a Man’s Pain? Welcome to
Modern Medicine’s Moral Cage Fight, STAT NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.statnews.com/2017/10/23/addiction-opioids-prescribing-doctors/ [http://perma
.cc/UQG8-ESL2]; see also Sarah Frostenson, The Crackdown on Opioid Prescriptions Is
Leaving Chronic Pain Patients in Limbo, VOX (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/scienceand-health/2017/4/7/14738292/crackdown-opioid-prescriptions-chronic-pain [http://perma.
cc/6JYK-4FZG].
191
Alison Knopf, Patients with Chronic Pain Forced into Opioid Tapers by their
Prescribers, 30 ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE WKLY. 1, 1–2 (2018); see also Sally Satel et al.,
Opioid Prescription Control: When the Corrective Goes Too Far, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.aei.org/publication/opioid-prescription-control-when-thecorrective-goes-too-far/ [https://perma.cc/6F5D-7FU3].
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See e.g., Sarah G. Mars et al., “Every ‘Never’ I Ever Said Came True”: Transitions
from Opioid Pills to Heroin Injecting, 25 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 257, 258 (2014).
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digital_data/crime-review-heroin-deaths-rise-as-prescription-policies-go-into/article_fcde
5d45-676a-54d4-873e-aac9a79b2cb0.html [http://perma.cc/9MH4-ZHF9].
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71 J. AM. MED. ASS’N PSYCHIATRY 821, 822 (2014).
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As heroin began to devastate largely white, nonurban communities,195 its
advent spurred a renewed emphasis on—and investment in—interdiction.196 This
included major scale-up in the staffing and funding of border control along the U.S.Mexico border, where the amount of heroin seized quintupled between 2008 and
2015.197 On the domestic front, law enforcement leaned on its toolkit of harsh
criminal penalties to disrupt the black market for opioids,198 including high-profile
drug-induced homicide prosecutions like that of Marcus Burrage.199
This Article has already discussed how interventions informed by a singular
focus on the supply of opioid drugs failed to accomplish their goals, in some ways
inadvertently fueling the very problem they sought to control. But it would be
incorrect to suggest that supply-reduction interventions have been the sole response
advanced to prevent opioid fatalities. Before turning to an in-depth analysis of druginduced homicide, it is useful to first examine innovative public health-driven
innovations that have evolved.
D. The Emergence of a “Public Health” Approach
Public health focuses on data-driven solutions and the imperative to prevent
harm before it happens.200 In the realm of demand reduction, the “public health
response” began with public and provider education and awareness.201 A number of
such informational campaigns focused on opioid misuse and overdose prevention.202
195
Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-war-on-drugsparents.html [http://perma.cc/U7ET-R353].
196
Id.
197
U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2016 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
41, 57 (2016), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DIR-001-17_2016_NDTA_
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2KR-A36L]; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ALONG U.S. BORDERS AND AT PORTS OF ENTRY: FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL EFFORTS 4–5 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/02/
borderenforcement_brief_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/8288-5KYF].
198
JIM PARSONS, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MINIMIZING HARM: PUBLIC HEALTH AND
JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSES TO DRUG USE AND THE OPIOID CRISIS 2 (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/for-the-recordpublic-health-justice-system-responses-opioid-crisis/legacy_downloads/Minimizing-HarmEvidence-Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/FPW5-3R2U].
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Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (granting certiori on the prosecution
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Martuzzi & Joel A. Tickner eds., 2004), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/
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The federal and state governments also took on a project to reduce the stigma of
problematic drug use to encourage those affected and their families to seek help.203
Demand reduction efforts also focused on increasing access to evidence-based
maintenance therapy.204 One of the definitive paradoxes of the overdose crisis is that
it is currently much easier to access pharmaceutical and black-market products that
cause addiction and increase overdose risk than it is to access medications designed
to reduce one’s overdose risk.205
The sheer prevalence and incidence of opioid mortality also created urgency
for decisive death prevention measures.206 Expanding naloxone availability has been
well-received by people who use drugs and other participants, including family
members, partners, and friends of both medical and nonmedical opioid users.207 Such

203

See, e.g., State without StigMA, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/state-withoutstigma [https://perma.cc/DM4P-4ZGF]; James D. Livingston et al., The Effectiveness of
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Review, 107 ADDICTION 39, 39–40 (2011).
204
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HEALTH SERV. & RES. 410, 410–11 (2014).
205
See Elizabeth M. Olivia et al., Barriers to Use of Pharmacotherapy for Addiction
Disorders and How to Overcome Them, 13 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 374, 374–75 (2011);
see also Beronio et al., supra note 204, at 411 (addressing increased overdose risk, the
Affordable Care Act strengthened parity provisions and included substance use treatment as
an essential health benefit); German Lopez, We Really Do Have a Solution to the Opioid
Epidemic — And One State Is Showing It Works, VOX (Dec. 22, 2018, 2:10 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/10/17256572/opioid-epidemic-virginiamedicaid-expansion-arts [http://perma.cc/L3K2-PE7D] (noting that Medicaid expansion
made such services accessible to many more low-income and disabled Americans); Proposed
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AM.
SOC’Y
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MED.
(July
6,
2016),
https://www.asam.org/resources/publications/magazine/read/article/2016/07/06/asamapplauds-important-action-to-help-close-addiction-treatment-gap.-proposed-patient-limitraised-to-275 [http://perma.cc/Y7SZ-4LJZ] (noting the previously imposed 200-patient cap
for prescribers of the maintenance drug buprenorphine was also recently lifted to 275
patients).
206
Surgeon General’s Advisory on Naloxone and Opioid Overdose, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/priorities/opioid-overdoseprevention/naloxone-advisory.html [http://perma.cc/6JZR-YDTP].
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This pattern counters moral hazard-based concerns that naloxone users will engage
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efforts have shown to reduce opioid overdose rates and be cost effective—even
despite recent major spikes in the cost of naloxone.208
Though lay administration of naloxone is a vital step in the public health
approach, the optimal response to an overdose is timely medical intervention.209 But
emergency medical assistance is too often not summoned when an overdose occurs.
This could be because there is no one to make the call; however, even when there
are bystanders who could call for help, they often fail to do so.210 Witnesses of
overdoses report they avoid contacting 911 because of concerns about police contact
and a cascade of legal consequences.211
The fear of legal consequences to overdose victims or bystanders is of key
relevance to drug-induced homicide and warrants special attention. By default,
dispatcher systems in most U.S. jurisdictions distribute emergency calls regarding
suspected overdoses to law enforcement.212 Depending on the jurisdiction’s
emergency response design and geographical setting, the police may be the first to
arrive on the scene. Their role has traditionally included providing security to
emergency medical personnel, but also frequently includes various forms of
intelligence gathering.213 Police involvement at overdose scenes may result in arrests
on drug, parole violation, weapons, and other charges.214 It may also lead to loss of
child custody, violation of community supervision conditions, and other legal
consequences rooted in pervasive stigmatization of substance use, but not directly
linked to criminal law.215
Research suggests that fear of police contact and legal detriment is actually the
single most important reason why people who witnessed overdoses do not seek

208

Phillip O. Coffin & Sean D. Sullivan, Cost-effectiveness of Distributing Naloxone
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209
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Melissa Tracy et al., Circumstances of Witnessed Drug Overdose in New York City:
Implications for Intervention, 79 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 181, 181–82 (2005).
211
Id. at 183.
212
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timely emergency medical help.216 This is particularly true of events that involve
heroin: out of all such overdoses, witnesses report calling 911 less than half the
time.217
The fear of legal repercussions likely costs thousands of American lives each
year. What fuels these deadly fears? At least in part, recent high-profile prosecutions
tied to overdose events.218
E. Redefining the Role of Criminal Law and Policing Practice
Public-health-focused innovation in response to the overdose crisis has even
impacted the stalwart focus on supply reduction laws and enforcement
interventions.219 Criminal justice professionals, including police and prosecutors,
have spoken out in recent years about their frustration with the traditional drug
control regime that emphasizes punishment and retribution.220
Public health innovation in the United States has the tendency to spring from
local communities advocating for their needs. This is the level where frontline
personnel engage in experimentation that defies traditional silos and, at times,
contravenes formal and informal norms in search of pragmatic solutions.221 As a
result, the discourse around the overdose crisis has begun to frame it as a “public
health problem, and not just a criminal problem.”222 Despite some recent shifts in

216
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222
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the opposite direction,223 the adage that “we can’t arrest our way out” of an overdose
and addiction crisis now figures prominently into policy discussions at all levels of
government.224
To remove barriers to help-seeking, almost all states have now passed 911 or
Good Samaritan laws, which carve out immunity from a limited set of criminal
provisions to reduce the legal consequences of calling 911.225 As part of a
comprehensive overdose package, New Mexico enacted one of the first such laws
exempting both the caller and the victim from drug possession charges.226 However,
this law and all others are limited to drug possession charges and do not extend to
drug trafficking charges.227 More progressive provisions also cover parole violations
and actual arrest, not just amnesty from prosecution.228
The role of risk perception is critical in this area. Research demonstrates that
people who use drugs—as well as, to a considerable extent, police officers—lack an
accurate understanding of Good Samaritan policies.229 When weighing the risk of
arrest during an overdose event, users’ assessment of their risk of arrest is
substantially higher than that of police.230 Some officers report using their
enforcement discretion to not arrest or charge individuals for various violations in
the spirit of the law, even if these are not covered by the scope of the Good Samaritan
amnesty.231 The extent to which such selective law enforcement decisions are
articulated and communicated to the broader public is unclear. Ultimately, it is the
perception of bystanders about legal risks to self or the victim that drives helpseeking behavior.232
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The primary public health innovation in the criminal justice realm has been
police training and access to naloxone.233 Popularized as the “Quincy Model” after
its successful adoption in 2010,234 it has rapidly expanded to police forces across the
country.235 Police are especially likely to be the first to arrive on the scene of an
overdose in rural locales and other settings like tribal areas, where emergency
medical service response times can be substantially longer than those of law
enforcement personnel.236 Nationwide, law enforcement officers outnumber medical
first responders by approximately a factor of three.237 Over 2,400238 police agencies
have now trained and equipped officers to resuscitate individuals during an
overdose, and they have done so in countless overdose events.239
Aside from this direct role in rescue operations, law enforcement can also
contribute to overdose prevention through other activities. These could include
disseminating information about signs and symptoms of overdose,240 advice on
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accessing naloxone,241 promoting Good Samaritan policies,242 and facilitating
linkage to drug treatment and other services.243
Although Good Samaritan policies may have limited impact on actual arrest
practices, concerns about being arrested at the scene of an overdose may or may not
be based on the correct perception of risk.244 In fact, research suggests that users may
estimate such risk as higher than self-reported practices by police.245
Another notable example of police innovation is the Law Enforcement Assisted
Diversion (LEAD) model.246 This intervention emerged as a result of a deliberation
process between criminal justice and public defender organizations.247 The LEAD
model offers police a structure for prearrest diversion that can be discretionarily
applied to people who use drugs and other nonviolent offenders. 248 This structure is
distinct from other service linkage interventions in that it gives police the tools to
facilitate access to a case manager, who then acts as a navigator for broad range of
housing, job training, health, and other social services above and beyond

241

See generally Rebecca E. Giglio et al., Effectiveness of Bystander Naloxone
Administration and Overdose Education Programs: A Meta-Analysis, 2 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY
1, 8 (2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40621-015-0041-8 [https://perma.cc
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treatment.249 It thus begins to address the structural drivers of substance use, but
without involving the criminal justice system.
All of these innovations occurred in the context of broader criminal justice
reform. The last decade has been characterized by a gradual bipartisan shift in
numerous jurisdictions away from the philosophy of harsh punishment and
incarceration.250 This has included sentencing reforms, such as repealing mandatory
minimums and three-strikes laws, as well as reducing the disparity in penalties for
powder cocaine vis-à-vis crack. 251 It has also included clemency and pardon for
individuals incarcerated on drug-related charges, along with a broader momentum
towards prosecutorial reform.252
Drug courts represent one additional diversionary mechanism. However, in
taking on addiction as part of the drug court system, jurists are basically taking on
the role of medical professionals, which they are not technically licensed, nor
equipped, to do.253 The results are tragic,254 as what has resulted is highly undesirable
from a health care and public health perspective. For example, many drug courts
mandate that to be classified as “clean,” individuals are prohibited from engaging
opioid maintenance therapy, including medications like methadone and
buprenorphine.255
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post.com/2014/12/17/obama-clemency-drug-defendants_n_6343722.html [https://perma.cc
/MK7Y-WXGG]; see also Allie Malloy, Obama Grants Clemency to 231 Individuals,
Largest
Single
Day
Act,
CNN
(Dec.
20,
2016,
7:02
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/19/politics/obama-clemency/index.html [https://perma.cc/
RE7R-7S4C].
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15, 2017), https://phr.org/resources/niether-justice-nor-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/GR2FCNMM].
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Maia Szalavitz, How America Overdosed on Drug Courts, PAC. STANDARD (May
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These medications are FDA-approved to treat opioid addiction and are the gold
standard for such treatment,256 but evidently do not comport with what many drug
court judges and administrators consider abstinence.
This folly in the drug court system has received considerable—though perhaps
niche—attention as of late.257 There has been positive progress towards creating
some semblance of standardization through proposed federal requirements.258 For
example, refusing drug court participants medication can run the risk of losing
federal funding.259 The bottom line is that most of these courts have done a very poor
job of actually doing what they purport to be doing, which is offering those affected
by addiction the help they need and deserve.260
Ultimately, these various innovations have certainly expanded the traditional
criminal justice toolkit towards policies and practices closer aligned with public
health goals.261 Despite their symbolic and rhetorical importance, however, these
changes have been relatively marginal and fragile.262 Except for substantial state
policy shifts on marijuana and the limited immunity provisions described above, the
basic policy regime for drug control has remained intact.263
Although government budgets saw some shifts towards harm and demand
reduction, the enormous outlays on supply-side interventions and correctional costs
256

See generally Angela L. Stotts et al., Opioid Dependence Treatment: Options in
Pharmacotherapy, 10 EXPERT OPINION PHARMACOTHERAPY 1727 (2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2874458/ [https://perma.cc/D2X6-8QHW]
(discussing pharmacological methods and their success in treating opioid addiction).
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Jason Cherkis, Dying To Be Free, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/dying-to-be-free-heroin-treatment [http://perma.cc/RN
K9-KPPM]; Steven W. Varney, Practicing Medicine Without a License: MedicationAssisted Treatment in the Courts, FIX (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.thefix.com/practicingmedicine-without-license-medication-assisted-treatment-courts [https://perma.cc/AMM4XEQJ].
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[https://perma.cc/XG34-KJSV].
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Medicine from the Bench, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2015, 8:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/common-sense-wins-in-ny_us_560ae76ce4b0dd8503
097d54 [http://perma.cc/JH4U-7FU7].
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have continued to dwarf these public health investments.264 The failure to translate
evidence into policy has meant that law—especially criminal law—and its
enforcement is a major structural barrier to the deployment of proven public health
strategies.
Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the flawed operationalization of the
“public health approach” has been the expansion in scope of drug-induced homicide
laws and prosecutions. Although these measures are billed as overdose prevention,
they lack the requisite elements incumbent on public health measures, namely
evidence, or at the very least, solid promise, of positive impact.
III. DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE
The implied mission of criminal justice professionals and institutions is to
safeguard the constituencies they serve.265 The same goes for elected and
administrative policymakers.266 Significant threats to that safety create a strong
impetus to mount decisive and remedial action, using persuasive policy narratives
and resonant tropes.267 Such action is shaped by the choice architecture,268 where
incentives like electioneering strategies, financial resources, and the broader policy
environment drive prosecutorial decision-making.
When faced with the mounting death toll from opioid overdose, some criminal
justice systems and professionals have innovated by adopting novel approaches,
policies, and rhetorical tools.269 Pertinent to this Article are legal provisions and their
deployment against individuals who supply drugs to overdose victims. After
defining these instruments, the following Sections interrogate their deployment from
both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
A. Drug-Induced Homicide: The Legacy of Len Bias
In 1970, Congress first established penalties for the distribution of controlled
substances in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act; however, the law passed
without a “death results” enhancement.270 Nevertheless, concerns about heroin
264
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See, e.g., Constituent Services, MARCO RUBIO, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public
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overdose did figure into the legislative debate about the law, with a special concern
about metropolitan youth, for whom heroin overdose was then one of the leading
causes of death.271
As often happens in policymaking,272 the impetus for reform came from an
especially visible and shocking event. In 1986, a widely admired rising basketball
star Len Bias died of a cocaine overdose just two days after he had been drafted into
the NBA.273 Set within the context of unfolding concern over crack in American
inner cities, the “public outcry” about Bias’ death motivated the drafting of the new
death results enhancement.274 It was this provision—§ 841(b)(1)(C)—that federal
prosecutors would years later use to charge Marcus Burrage.275
Today, almost half of U.S. state jurisdictions have a specific statute to facilitate
drug-induced homicide prosecutions.276 Although they all use an analogous
instrumental framework, these provisions use a variety of criminal law constructs,
including felony-murder,277 depraved heart offenses,278 or involuntary or voluntary

271

Id.
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Dream”).
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276
As of this writing, extant statutes include: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(e) (2019); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1)(a)(3)–(4) (2019); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.317(a) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 609.195(b) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(IX)
(2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17(b)(2) (2019); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-6 (2019) (only applies to drug
delivery to a minor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(2) (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18, §
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manslaughter.279 At the extreme end of the punitive spectrum, states like West
Virginia prosecute drug-induced homicide under first-degree murder provisions,
punishable by life in prison, and possibly the death penalty.280
In the context of the overdose crisis, an increasing number of jurisdictions have
proposed entirely new or enhanced drug-induced homicide provisions to add to their
arsenal. The number of such proposals has significantly increased in recent years.281
B. Trends in Deployment of Drug-Induced Homicide Prosecutions
Aside from the surging policy reform push, there have been concerted efforts
to disseminate the prosecutorial strategy across the country. For instance,
prosecutors have led workshops focused on how to conduct overdose death scene
investigations and to work up drug-induced homicide charges.282 The U.S.
Department of Justice specifically recommended prosecuting heroin dealers in cases
of overdose by more actively utilizing the “death results” enhancement that was used
in Burrage.283 In addition to these dissemination strategies, the infrastructure for
these investigations has increasingly been reliant on interagency “task forces,”
which have been funded by both criminal justice and public health funds earmarked
for overdose crisis response.284
The principal supposed impact channel for the deployment of drug-induced
homicide deployment is informational. It is no accident that “sending a message” is
the stated legislative and prosecutorial objective of these instruments and their
applications.285 This is why lawmakers, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials
package their policy narratives about these laws and prosecutions into press

279
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280
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materials286 and hold high-profile press conferences287 when discussing druginduced homicide charges and convictions. Whatever the eventual impact of the
message, mass media plays a vital function in delivering this message to its
audiences.288 Before proceeding to critique this approach, it is worth assessing the
intensity and content of these signals.
Accurate quantification of the actual deployment of these provisions is limited
by a number of factors.289 The analysis within this Article relies on online news
trends between 2000 and 2016 as a proxy for frequency and amplification. Although
not always optimal in presenting a generalizable picture of real-world events, big
data techniques analyzing online informational ecosystems are being used with
increasing frequency and precision.290 The utilization of these techniques to track
the deployment of prosecutorial strategies is novel, however, and—to the author’s
knowledge—is being used in a law review article for the first time.
Based on the review of existing literature, the incidence of drug-induced
homicide deployments has risen sharply since 2010.291 Predictably, the rise is
especially notable in jurisdictions hard-hit by the overdose crisis, like those in

286
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Sullivan County
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Oregon,292 New Jersey,293 New York,294 and Wisconsin—where they doubled
between 2012 and 2013.295
This signaling element makes media reports a key proxy for the deployment of
drug-induced homicide instruments. A systematic analysis of news report searches
mentioning key search terms296 for each year between 2000 and 2017 was
conducted. Each positive hit was followed by manual review to avoid Type I error;
reviewers also coded each entry on a set of characteristics, including state,
relationship of the accused to the overdose victim, drugs implicated, and whether
the story specified the resolution of the case. Since the dataset focused on online
news reports, this information reflects a subsample of all media coverage.
Between 2000 and 2006, online media coverage ranged from just a few articles
annually, then beginning a sharp upward trend in 2009, increasing at a rising rate to
2017.297 This spike in prosecutions mentioned coincided with sharp rises in overdose
fatalities.298
Many of the states hardest hit by this surge in overdose fatalities have also
embraced drug-induced homicide prosecutions.299 The analysis of news trends
shows that Ohio, which saw 4,854 overdose deaths in 2017 alone,300 ranked as the
leader in news mentions of prosecutions, followed by Louisiana and Minnesota with
sixteen mentions each.301
In addition to these geographic trends, the present analysis considered the
nature of the relationship between the accused and the deceased. Data suggests that
292
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half of those charged with drug-induced homicide were not, in fact, “dealers” in the
traditional sense, but friends and partners to the deceased.302 Bringing these cases to
conviction requires a close nexus between the accused and the deceased, 303 as well
as a relatively quick resolution to respond to community pressure. Thus, these
prosecutions often ensnare those who are closest to the deceased, such as the
partners, coworkers, and friends.304
In our dataset, of the 47 percent of the cases that do involve drug distribution
by a “traditional” dealer, half (forty-three) of the individuals were either black or
Hispanic, and selling to whites.305 These statistics are not reflective of the racial
demographics of the United States,306 nor drug dealers as a population.307 In view of
that context, these findings suggest that drug-induced homicide charges are being
selectively and disproportionately deployed to target people of color. This disparate
application can further reinforce already dire racial disparities, particularly in the
enforcement of drug laws and the length of sentencing for drug-related crimes.308
This is especially notable, given that findings reflect sentencing for people of color
to be more than two years longer, on average, than for whites.309
To understand the extent to which this dataset of 263 online media mentions
was reflective of the entire ecosystem of drug-induced homicide cases, the analysis
triangulated this sample with Pennsylvania’s state court records for 2016. While
only seven cases in Pennsylvania received online news coverage in 2016, state
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records reveal eighty-nine prosecutions in that year alone.310 This indicates that the
extent to which these provisions are being utilized nationally is far greater than
reflected in the online news database.311
Now that the trajectory and key elements of these interventions have been
established, what follows is a discussion of the theoretical and empirical elements to
estimate their probable impact. Such impact has never been evaluated empirically.
C. Mapping Drug-Induced Homicide onto Intended Objectives of Criminal Law
1. Deterrence
The primary objective of drug-induced homicide prosecutions, as stated by the
vast majority of legislators and law enforcement, is one of deterrence: to put drug
dealers on notice in order to nudge—or scare—them away from black market
activity, thus averting future harm.312 The operative mechanism for this intervention
is the severity of punishment, typically mandated by the statute, imposed for
supplying drugs to overdose victims.313
The literature on the impact of punishment in general, and mandatory
minimums in particular, on criminal behavior314 suggests that the signaling intended
in the drafting and application of these harsh provisions fails for several reasons.
First, the Law and Economics model of criminal punishment conceptualizes the
deterrent effect to be a function of the penalty’s severity and the individual’s
perceived risk of getting caught.315
Second, in order for the deterrence effect to become operational under the Law
and Economics model, there must be a stable and transparent informational
310
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311
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312
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environment about the components of the penalty calculus.316 The imposition of the
drug-induced homicide provisions depends on several nested events, each with an
unknown—and unknowable—probabilistic setting.317 This includes the probability
that the drug provided will cause an overdose, whether the overdose will be fatal,
and whether the toxicology will identify the drug and link it to the dealer. Each of
these nested probabilities is neither stable nor transparent. For instance, the vast
majority of overdoses are due to polydrug toxicity.318 Even if the dealer could predict
the risk profile of their own product, they have no way of predicting what other
substances the user may consume at a later time and how these substances may
interact with the product.
Third, Behavioral Economics provides an additional basis for critique.319 In a
Classical Economics framework, the aim of criminal penalty is to impose an
additional cost to drug dealing, thus nudging the individual towards a suitable and
less costly alternative.320 This implies that the person impacted is indeed a “drug
dealer”—a somewhat ambiguous notion, given the fluidity of transactional
relationships between people who use drugs.321 From a structural perspective, many
street-level dealers—the kinds of actors who are typically on the receiving end of
these penalties—engage in subsistence black market activity precisely because of
the lack of other suitable employment alternatives.322
Fourth, there is a basis to question whether or not the “rational actor model” is
applicable as an empirical matter.323 Some of those impacted by these
prosecutions—including many of the “dealers”—may themselves be affected by
severe forms of SUD.324 No matter whether one ascribes to the fully medicalized
BDMA described above, there is little question that individuals with SUD do not
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POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/drug-dealer-economicspart-time_n_1775811.html [http://perma.cc/ZTQ5-LMWE] (“[E]ssentially it is the same as
living paycheck-to-paycheck, which is sort of a sad fact and kind of why I’m [selling drugs]
in the first place, because you know what, paycheck-to-paycheck isn’t enough anymore.”).
323
See generally Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszeg, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory
and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7507, 2000),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w7507.pdf [http://perma.cc/WX39-PBFA].
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comport with the Classical Economics view of homos economicus.325 This
substantially undermines the application of Law and Economics model of deterrence
in this realm.326 If assuming the rational actor model is operative, this leads to an
absurd result because a rational seller who depends on a consistent clientele would
never intentionally sell a product that cuts his consumer base.327
Fifth, the additional cost may also be conceptualized to incentivize a shift away
from a certain drug supply chain that is especially risky (e.g., because the product is
laced with fentanyl).328 This depends on two factors: one, knowledge of the contents
in the product; and two, ability to shift to an alternative supplier. Neither of these
conditions typically reflect reality. Low-level dealers rarely know the contents of the
product in their supply chain or can predict its risk.329 These contents also frequently
fluctuate—often as a result of interdiction activities and other law enforcement
efforts to disrupt the market,330 further complicating any rational decision-making.
From an empirical perspective, we saw a massive failure of this choice
architecture model in the context of the powder cocaine versus crack cocaine
disparity.331 This provision did not impact the availability or consumption of crack
but did fuel mass incarceration of mostly impoverished African-American men.332
2. Incapacitation
The incapacitation objective of enhanced and prolonged mandatory sentences
is similarly vulnerable to several critiques. It has long been discredited by empirical
325

See generally Redonna Chandler et al., Treating Drug Abuse and Addiction in the
Criminal Justice System: Improving Public Health and Safety, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 183
(2009).
326
See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
327
David Hillier, We Asked Dealers If They Care About Their Customers’ Safety, VICE
(July 14, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjxz4v/we-asked-dealers-ifthey-care-about-their-customers-safety [http://perma.cc/WT7T-TDHV] (interviewing drug
dealers that said they did not care about their clients because they sold to older groups or
because they never directly met their customers).
328
See generally Jennifer J. Carrol et al., Exposure to Fentanyl-Contaminated Heroin
and Overdose Risk Among Illicit Opioid Users in Rhode Island: A Mixed Methods Study, 46
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 136 (2017).
329
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Public Data Presentation for Synthetic Cathinones,
Synthetic Cannabinoids, and Fentanyl and Fentanyl Analogues Amendments 24 (Jan. 2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/data-briefings/2018
_synthetic-drugs.pdf [http://perma.cc/2D5B-TFXL].
330
Daniel Ciccarone, Fentanyl in the US Herion Supply: A Rapidly Changing Risk
Environment, 46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 107, 107–08 (2017).
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(2013).
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research,333 though it is now resurgent at the center of some states’ and the current
federal administration’s strategy to combat the overdose crisis.334
The stated objectives for some policy and prosecutorial deployments is to
incapacitate major dealers, not street-level sellers.335 The feasibility of this is
questionable. As Burrage and subsequent cases336 illustrate, evidentiary parameters
constrain the scope of application of these provisions.337 In his opinion in Burrage,
Justice Scalia provided an engaging illustration of this problem in terms of layers of
causation that can be attributed for hitting a home run.338
The analysis of the cases suggests that the application of drug-induced
homicide provisions is constrained by evidentiary concerns only to tightly proximate
individuals.339 Finally, from a historical perspective, the emergence of the overdose
crisis just as the United States had reached the zenith of mass incarceration on drugrelated offenses340 severely undercuts the broader incapacitation rationale.

333
See generally Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does
the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 275 (2012) (proposing that long-term
incarceration demonstrates the law of diminishing returns).
334
Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to All Federal Prosecutors
on Commitment to Targeting Violent Crime (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
press-release/file/946771/download [http://perma.cc/4Y7W-SA3H] (stating, in face of
evidence to the contrary, that “disrupting and dismantling . . . drug organizations through
prosecutions under the Controlled Substances Act can drive violent crime down.”).
335
David Ovalle, Drug Dealers as Murderers? Proposed Florida Law Targets Sellers
Fueling Overdose Crisis, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/crime/article136809238.html [http://perma.cc/3KBT-XJU4].
336
Santillana v. Upton, 846 F.3d 779 (5th Cir. 2017) (reversing and remanding an
enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) because Burrage applied retroactively).
337
Ovalle, supra note 335.
338
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211–12 (2014) (“Consider a baseball game
in which the visiting team’s leadoff batter hits a home run in the top of the first inning. If the
visiting team goes on to win by a score of 1 to 0, every person competent in the English
language and familiar with the American pastime would agree that the victory resulted from
the home run. This is so because it is natural to say that one event is the out-come or
consequence of another when the former would not have occurred but for the latter. It is
beside the point that the victory also resulted from a host of other necessary causes, such as
skillful pitching, the coach’s decision to put the leadoff batter in the lineup, and the league’s
decision to schedule the game. By contrast, it makes little sense to say that an event resulted
from or was the outcome of some earlier action if the action merely played a nonessential
contributing role in producing the event.”).
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Id.
340
James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July
20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/history-mass-incarceration [http://perma.cc/
T4AJ-8KGK].
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3. Retribution
Retribution is arguably the most central objective of these interventions,
whereby the action itself and its communication is designed to assure those bereaved
by the particular overdose that “justice is being done.”341 By speaking to members
of the public, these actors are also seeking to shape the policy narrative in a
reassuring way to signal that someone is being held responsible for the victim’s
death, as well as for the ongoing carnage.342
The actual application of the retribution rationale is probably the most aligned
out of all of the implied objectives. Many—though by no means all343—victims’
families and others express support344 for drug-induced homicide prosecutions. But
considering many of the accused are themselves marginalized and may suffer from
addiction, the application of this intervention only further traumatizes already
vulnerable people.345 This pattern fits with the broader critique of “the politics of
victimhood,” which uses the victims’ rights framework to rationalize policy
narratives that emphasize retributive, rather than rehabilitative approaches.346

341

Zachary Siegel, In an Upstate New York Community Wracked by Overdoses,
Prosecutor Pursues Users in Homicides Cases, APPEAL (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://injusticetoday.com/in-an-upstate-new-york-community-wracked-by-overdosesprosecutor-pursues-users-in-homicides-cases-a0a9f473
[http://perma.cc/6SRR-YCWQ]
(discussing a District Attorney’s rationale for drug-induced homicide prosecutions).
342
Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to United States Attorneys
on Guidance Regarding Use of Capital Punishment in Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 20,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1045036/download [http://perma.cc/FF84-WAMZ]
(requesting action to execute drug dealers).
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Daniel Denvir, Heroin, Murder, and the New Front in the War on Drugs, VICE (Sept.
28, 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qbxwnp/heroin-murder-and-the-new-frontin-the-war-on-drugs-928 [http://perma.cc/8T84-G6EQ].
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(Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/17/maura-healey-proposesnew-law-targeting-opioid-traffickers/geOZTEmdm5lC6KX9eeOKhK/story.html
[http://perma.cc/H2UJ-BV4C].
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Daniel Denvir, The Opioid Crisis Is Blurring the Legal Lines Between Victim and
Perpetrator, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/theopioid-crisis-is-blurring-the-legal-lines-between-victim-and-perpetrator.html [http://perma.
cc/WLJ7-9N8X].
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Christopher Moraff, Moraff: The Politics of Victimhood, SIMPLE JUST. (May 10,
2018),
https://blog.simplejustice.us/2018/05/10/moraff-the-politics-of-victimhood/
[https://perma.cc/GNE6-KLWS] (“The crime epidemic threat [that] has spread throughout
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accused . . . We should be proud that our constitutional system protects the rights of the
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Finally, the application of a harsh sentence for an action considered by most to
be a minor offense violates the principle of proportionality.347 Surely, the death of
any person is tragic. Singling out friends, dealers, or doctors who may have
contributed to that fatality is both unfair and arbitrary, resulting in misplaced blame
that muddles effective remedial action.
4. Population Health Impact
In addition to the theoretical and empirical critiques articulated above, the
discussion of public health imperatives and structural drivers of the crisis implies
additional concerns.348 Treating every overdose event as a crime scene and charging
overdose witnesses with drug-induced homicide can deter help-seeking during
overdose emergencies.349 From the public health point of view, the benefit of saving
the life of an overdose victim outweighs any retributive, deterrent, or other criminal
justice rationale for prosecuting bystanders for their potential role in an unintentional
overdose event.350
Despite their prominent place in materials put forward by other agencies on the
overdose crisis,351 it is no accident that the former Surgeon General’s landmark
report on the overdose crisis does not mention drug-induced homicide as an
overdose prevention strategy. Its absence among researchers who have studied the
roots of the crisis is simple: it isn’t a strategy.352
But because law enforcement perceives them as an effective signaling vehicle,
such counterproductive efforts receive wide media coverage.353 Contrast this to
Good Samaritan laws, which typically receive little exposure and are only
marginally known and understood by the members of the public.354 Lack of clarity
about the technical implications of these competing provisions likely leads to
overestimation of legal risk. This scrambling of competing behavioral signals may,
in part, explain the relatively anemic impact of Good Samaritan laws on helpseeking observed thus far.355

347

See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2009)
(discussing the application of proportionality principles in courts in the United States).
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See Dasgupta et al., supra note 93.
349
See Latimore & Bergstein, supra note 49.
350
See Giftos & Tesema, supra note 261.
351
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 283.
352
See FACING ADDICTION, supra note 29.
353
Zachary A. Siegel, Despite “Public Health” Messaging, Law Enforcement
Increasingly Prosecutes Overdoses as Homicides, APPEAL (Nov. 8, 2017), https://theappeal.
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See Banta-Green et al., supra note 212.
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Although 911 Good Samaritan laws hold promise, their impact is limited by
several factors. First, they only apply to a limited set of drug possession violations,
typically involving small-scale drug possession;356 state laws also have no bearing
on criminal liability under federal law, and there is no analogous 911 Good
Samaritan provision on the federal level.357 Secondly, the vast majority of people
who use drugs, the public, and even many police officers may not be aware of such
laws.358 In this context, aggressive and mounting application of criminal
prosecutions following overdose events totally thwart any positive public health
impact of Good Samaritan legislation and other efforts to encourage overdose
witnesses and people who use drugs to seek help.359
It is also imperative to mention that the application of these interventions also
appears to violate racial justice. Although the racial profiles of the accused were
seldom available, preliminary analysis suggests that drug-induced homicides
prosecutions disproportionately target people of color.360 For instance, Marcus
Burrage is black,361 while Joshua Banka was white.362 These patterns harken back to
the most egregious elements of the War on Drugs.363
From the public health perspective, the racial dynamics of these prosecutions
may also inadvertently worsen disparities in access to care. For example, disparate
application of these prosecutions may further undermine trust in police among
people of color.364 To the extent that criminal justice institutions and actors can now
356

See Latimore & Bergstein, supra note 49.
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federal laws).
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facilitate access to assistance, this distrust can create a service barrier for those
groups. So, although an “angel program” of the type popularized by PAARI may
work in Gloucester, Massachusetts, it would not likely enjoy the same level of
popularity in a locale like Ferguson, Missouri.365
Surging reliance on drug-induced homicide charges is also a dangerous
distraction, which threatens to crowd out other evidence-driven efforts.366 These
prosecutions are resource intensive,367 all the while many public health agencies and
nonprofits already operate in an environment of extreme scarcity.368 The price of
naloxone is rising at a time when a large proportion of funds is being spent on
distributing this lifesaving drug to law enforcement agencies, rather than people
most likely to be at overdose events at a time of the emergency. 369 Although
punishing specific individuals for overdose events may make us feel that we are
making progress, public resources are too limited to be spent on policy theater.
Drug-induced homicide is perhaps the most vivid illustration of a larger
structural problem. Doubling down on punishment and coercion as an antidote to
drug crises has been the go-to choice for criminal justice actors.370 Other law
enforcement actions in this realm have included vast scale-up in drug interdiction
efforts, charges levied against overdose victims for “inducing panic,” 371 and advent
of new operating policies to detain overdose victims for admission to treatment.
365
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Legislative efforts have paralleled such law enforcement activity, advancing
involuntary commitment, involuntary treatment, and other coercive mechanisms.372
Urgent actions are needed to challenge these efforts on both the individual and
structural levels.373
IV. CRISIS AS OPPORTUNITY: RE-ENVISIONING U.S. DRUG CONTROL
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Choosing the right remedy is dependent on first being able to accurately
identify the ailment. By failing to properly “diagnose” the problem, we have thus far
largely failed in formulating effective remedies. Short-sighted interventions to curb
overdose have primarily focused on reducing prescription opioid supply because that
was believed to be the primary culprit of the crisis.374 These interventions included
crackdowns on unscrupulous providers, new prescription course limits and
guidelines, prescription monitoring efforts, and reformulation of medications to
make them more difficult to misuse.375
Despite modest shifts towards a public health frame, the policy and
programmatic response to the crisis indicates that the change has remained largely
rhetorical. Policymakers, prosecutors, and the police have continued to draw on the
arsenal of carceral and punitive tools in mounting the response.376 These actions
reflect established dynamics of policy theater,377 where public figures tend towards

372

Leo Beletsky et al., Expanding Coercive Treatment Is the Wrong Solution for the
Opioid Crisis, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/h
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373
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actions that are visible and noteworthy, regardless of their ultimate impact.378 Such
actions are characterized by immediate benefits in terms of elevated public approval
and community well-being, but deferred actual cost.379 Continued and relapsing
reliance on approaches that lead to negative consequences in our policy response to
drug crises is indeed akin to the very definition of addiction.380
This analysis fits squarely within the discourse on the urgent need for criminal
justice reform, especially as it relates to systems-level change in areas like the
outsized power of prosecutors as arbiters of public policy. A better theoretical and
practical vision for the “Public Health Approach” to the overdose crisis is necessary.
Such an approach implies a move away from a Law-and-Economics-based
framework towards a population health policy framework. As Wendy Parmet
articulates, population health considerations should animate judicial and policy
decision-making.381 Conceptualization of law as vested with the historical, ethical,
and instrumental ammunition to pursue this goal implies that the welfare of
populations, rather than solely individuals, be used as the unit of legal analyses.382
Parmet’s conceptualization of the population-based legal framework also implies the
need to internalize and integrate public health epistemology into law in the form of
probabilistic and epidemiological thinking.383
Since the heyday of major disease threats, public health in general and public
health regulation in particular have been victims of their own success. As the
tangible threats of communicable disease have receded, the impact of public health
interventions has become less visible and more diffuse.384 Just as public health
science and public health research are generating an increasingly robust evidence
base, translating this evidence into policy and practice is another matter entirely.
The “prevention paradox”385 is that the impact of successful public health and
other preventative interventions is often in avoidance of a potential harm; it is
therefore virtually “invisible.” In contrast to medicine or criminal law, the
beneficiaries of public health efforts are often unidentified, and the benefits
temporarily removed from the actions by years, if not decades.386 Costs of these
diffuse benefits to unnamed beneficiaries are nonetheless borne by all taxpayers,
378
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who tend to resent them.387 Finally, aside from highly visible catastrophic events,
the rationale driving public health action is often based on probabilistic evidence
that is in conflict with many people’s understanding of what causes ill health or their
moral views and values.388 Americans generally favor the idea of investing in public
health prevention;389 when asked about specific program expenditures, however,
support markedly diminishes to a relatively small minority of respondents.390
Criminal law interventions do not suffer from many of the same “prevention
paradox” problems.391 They are highly visible, decisive, and do not require the kind
of leap of faith about prevented harm that is critical to bolstering public health
prevention policies.392 Criminal law interventions like successful prosecutions build
on persuasive, if simplistic policy narratives, creating a perception of a tangible
success to a number of key stakeholders.393 Those directly affected by the overdose
may experience a sense of vindication. Prosecutorial and law enforcement incentives
are highly aligned with such actions, rather than prevention or “public health”
approaches. 394
And yet, investment in public health regulation and infrastructure produces not
only improvements in quality of life and its duration, but also substantial return on
investment.395 These data have supported arguments for shoring up existing—and
building new—tools to pursue population health under a new framework.396 Public
health advocates have maintained that, in the context of wider social change on the
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national and global levels, emerging public health threats require agility and
authority in public health programming and regulatory response.397
A corollary development has been in the field of public health law research,
where sophisticated empirical methods are being used to assess the direct or
incidental impact of laws on health.398 Today, more than at any other time, the
growing empirical evidence base can be used to shape policy decisions.399 Given
that the evidence has already established several key elements of a policy response
that holds the most promise, these tools should be brought to bear on the overdose
crisis.
Beyond the most immediate interventions, the structural determinant
framework is critical to engage in addressing root causes. For instance, better access
to health care, reducing income inequality, and assuring healthy work and living
environments are all critical to meaningful efforts to address the overdose crisis and
other drug-related harms.400 However, there is currently substantial opposition to the
kinds of tax policy, regulatory policy, and social policy actions that hold the most
promise to advance this agenda. The use of labels like “totalitarianism” or “nannystatism” is routinely misdirected at government attempts to impact structural
determinants of health.401
In contrast, addressing structural determinants implies a communitarian vision.
But the “every man for himself” stark individualism attacks the social contract that
is foundational to the theory and practice of public health.402 This framing also
encourages the view of classes, races, and regions different from one’s own as “the
other.”403 The trope of individualism also runs counter to government efforts to
ameliorate one of the most significant public health challenges of our time—health
disparities.404
Drawing on the maxim that “no crisis should go to waste,” the overdose crisis
presents a unique opportunity to deploy population-based health legal analysis in
397
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rethinking how we regulate drugs. The crisis has vividly demonstrated that the
systems we have in place fail to meet patient needs in access to pain, substance use
treatment, and other pharmacotherapy, while the regulation of black markets for
drugs could hardly be any more harmful.405
Despite overlapping mandates and functions, the DEA and the FDA now each
consume annual federal appropriations in the billions of dollars. Aside from an
opportunity to improve public health outcomes and generate significant costsavings, several current trends further rationalize the exploration of FDA-DEA
consolidation. The regulatory landscape for marijuana is undergoing a historic
transformation.406 Simultaneously, the calls to advance a “public health approach”
to drug misuse imply a move away from the criminal justice-based framework that
serves as the DEA’s raison d’être. Some principal challenges to such consolidation,
however, would include the extensive legal reforms that would be necessary to
effectuate it.
Adoption of a public health approach to drug regulation must also include a
redesign of the Controlled Substances Act. The negative impact of this statutory
regime and criminal law in general goes beyond its instrumental collateral harms.
Doing so confronts the stark reality that the core function of criminal law is
normative, intended to stigmatize drug use and people who use drugs. Decades after
Robinson, this criminal law framework remains largely in place. If the goal is to
reduce stigma, then revisiting the criminal law framework must be part of that
imperative.
CONCLUSION
As the overdose crisis lays bare, history has proven drug control regulation
rooted in supply-side interventions a dismal failure. Widespread adoption and
aggressive enforcement of punitive drug laws have done little to reduce drug-related
harms. In the context of the overdose crisis, an increasing number of jurisdictions
has proposed entirely new, or enhanced, drug-induced homicide provisions. Both in
their design and their application, these provisions promise to do far more harm than
good. Notably, this analysis reframes the need for criminal justice reform as a public
health imperative, critical to improving the response to the worst drug crisis in
America’s history.
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